Vol. 67, Issue 3, 2015January 01, 2016 EDT
REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors
REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors
Henry N. Butler,
Articles in Vol. 67, Issue 3, 2015
Vol. 67, Issue 3, 2015
- Fake Arbitration: Why Florida's Nonbinding Arbitration Proceudre is Not Arbitration Within the Scope of the Federal Arbitration ActAndrew Daeschsel
- Am I Under Arrest? Why the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Need a Strict Definition of What Constitutes an Intervening ArrestRebekah R. Runyon
- REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General CompetitorsHenry N. Butler
- A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum Corporation to the Twenty-First CenturyHarwell Wells
- Marriage Equality, Workplace Inequality: The Next Gay Rights BattleKeith Cunningham-Paremeter
- What is Federal Habeas Worth?Samuel R. Wiseman
- Do Conservative Justices Favor Wall Street? Ideology and the Supreme Court's Securities Regulation DecisionsJohannes W. FedderkeMarco Ventoruzzo
Henry N. Butler, REMS-Restricted Drug Distribution Programs and the Antitrust Economics of Refusals to Deal with Potential General Competitors, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 977 (2016).