Immigration “DISAGGREGATION” AND THE MAINSTREAMING OF IMMIGRATION LAW

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Immigration scholars have written volumes on a remarkable outlier of modern American constitutional law. Originally created by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century to uphold the now-discredited laws excluding Chinese immigrants from American shores, the “plenary power” doctrine continues to immunize the substantive provisions of the U.S. immigration laws from meaningful judicial review.1 Despite the intervening constitutional revolution of the twentieth century, this doctrine surprisingly enough remains, as a lawyer might say, “good law.”2 Although “cracks” in its fabric have emerged with the passage of time,3 the plenary power doctrine today stands out as the most visible modern example of what immigration scholars have characterized as “immigration exceptionalism.”

As a historical matter, the plenary power doctrine has facilitated the development of a peculiar set of immigration laws well-known for discriminating against noncitizens. That discrimination historically included, but was not limited to, denying admission into the United States of Asians, the poor, the disabled, and political minorities; the

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2. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79–80 (1976) (“In the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens. The exclusion of aliens and the reservation of the power to deport have no permissible counterpart in the Federal Government’s power to regulate the conduct of its own citizenry.”) (footnotes omitted).


immigration laws also have routinely disadvantaged women.\textsuperscript{5} Consider
that the immigration laws to this day prohibit entry of a noncitizen “who . . . is likely at any time to become a public charge”; put differently, even if otherwise eligible for a visa, a noncitizen can lawfully be denied admission into the country for being of modest economic means.\textsuperscript{6} In contrast, the states cannot take steps to deny entry into their jurisdictions of indigent citizens from other states.\textsuperscript{7}

The Supreme Court regularly struggles to rationalize the extremes of American immigration law perpetuated by the plenary power doctrine. In 2001, for example, the Court recognized the extraordinary nature of the indefinite detention of immigrants, which it previously held to be immune from judicial review\textsuperscript{8} even though such a result would be patently unconstitutional if the case involved the detention of U.S. citizens. The Court therefore interpreted the immigration statute to avoid the “serious constitutional problem” implicated by indefinite detention.\textsuperscript{9}

As this modern example suggests, despite the plenary power doctrine’s longevity, the Supreme Court has slowly moved toward an increasingly unexceptional body of immigration law.\textsuperscript{10} In so doing, the Court has ensured that ordinary procedural due process norms apply to hearings in which the U.S. government seeks to remove noncitizens from the country.\textsuperscript{11}


\textsuperscript{7} See Sáenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507, 511 (1999) (holding that a state’s limitation of public benefits to newcomers unconstitutionally interfered with the right to travel); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (invalidating a California law prohibiting the bringing of an “indigent person” into the state).

\textsuperscript{8} See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 216 (1953) (precluding judicial review of the indefinite detention of a long term lawful resident of the United States whose native country would not accept his return).


\textsuperscript{11} See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50 (1950), superseded by statute, Supplemental Appropriation Act, 64 Stat. 1044, 1048, as recognized in Ardestani v. I.N.S. (“A deportation hearing involves issues basic to human liberty and happiness and . . . perhaps to life itself.”); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) (“That deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness.”); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284
substantive rights to undocumented immigrants residing in the United States.12

Even with the erosion of the plenary power doctrine, conundrums in the law touching on immigration and immigrants remain. One is, as described above, the glaring disjunction between the full constitutional protections enjoyed by U.S. citizens compared to the constricted rights of noncitizens.13 In that vein, Professor Jenny Brooke-Condon has critically analyzed the Supreme Court’s incongruent Equal Protection doctrine, which requires strict scrutiny review of state laws discriminating against lawful permanent residents but extremely deferential review of federal laws that do the same.14 Such disparate treatment is difficult to rationalize as a matter of contemporary constitutional doctrine.15

A perspicacious student of constitutional immigration law,16 Professor Matthew Lindsay, in his latest article on the subject, adds meaningfully to the existing body of scholarship.17 He analyzes a fundamental question that immigration law scholars have long prodded the courts to answer definitively: In a nation bound by a national constitution, what role, if any, does the U.S. Constitution play in the review of the immigration laws? Over the last two centuries, the Supreme Court has failed to decisively answer that all-important question. At the same time, the Court on a case-by-case basis has inched toward increasingly “normal” judicial review of most immigration

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13. See supra text accompanying notes 5–9.


decisions.\(^{18}\)

Professor Lindsay looks at a serious obstacle to abrogation of the plenary power doctrine and a move toward judicial review of the immigration laws, namely

> the notion that laws and regulations governing the rights of noncitizens to enter and remain within the United States comprise a discrete body of immigration laws that are presumed to be part and parcel of foreign affairs and national security. [The Article] argues that this presumption is descriptively and analytically incoherent, and that its incoherence has produced a cascade of doctrinal confusion and substantive injustice. The Supreme Court should instead disaggregate immigration law for the purpose of constitutional review and recognize both federal and state regulation of noncitizens for what it is: a variegated conglomeration of laws and enforcement actions that concern labor, crime, public health and welfare, and, sometimes, foreign affairs and national security.\(^{19}\)

In making this argument, Professor Lindsay begins by reviewing the law concerning federal power over immigration, including the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence surrounding the treatment of immigrants in the United States. He next questions what has come to be viewed as the “natural” plenary power doctrine, showing how its roots and rationale fail to support the blanket immunity of the immigration laws from judicial review. Professor Lindsay proceeds to argue for the dismantling of exceptional immigration law, through what he characterizes as “disaggregating,” or removing, matters from the category of immigration law and exercise ordinary review of that law. He discusses how disaggregation might work with respect to public benefits, removal, detention, and other areas touching on immigrants and immigration.\(^{20}\)

Professor Lindsay identifies important trends in the Supreme Court’s contemporary immigration jurisprudence. In recent years, the Court has decided immigration cases in ways so as to avoid applying the plenary power doctrine, thus eluding the challenging task of justifying the blanket immunity from judicial review required by contemporary

\(^{18}\) See, e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (acknowledging “the limited scope of judicial inquiry into immigration legislation”); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (requiring that the Attorney General provide a “facially legitimate and bona fide” reason for denying entry into the United States by a noncitizen for a temporary visit).

\(^{19}\) Lindsay, supra note 17, at 185–86 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For a contemporary foreign affairs defense of the plenary power doctrine, see David A. Martin, Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015).

\(^{20}\) See Lindsay, supra note 17, at 239–59.
The Court has increasingly applied ordinary legal doctrines to immigration cases. For example, applying the normal federal preemption principles, two recent Supreme Court decisions addressed the question whether federal immigration law displaced state laws seeking to regulate immigration. In other cases, the Court has applied ordinary administrative law principles in reviewing agency interpretations of the immigration statute. These decisions reflect pressures on the Court to avoid invoking the plenary power doctrine and its jarring bar to judicial review.

The slow and incremental dismantling of immigration exceptionalism can be understood through application of general jurisprudential theories about the evolution of the law. Incongruities in the law naturally lead to efforts to reconcile legal doctrine. Although practical fears and concerns, such as foreign affairs, national security, and related issues, may seem to militate in favor of immigration “exceptionalism” in extreme cases, the forces of time and intellectual coherence move the law toward doctrinal congruence in the run-of-the-mill immigration cases. That, it would seem, is the future of the exceptional body of law currently known as immigration law.

The Supreme Court’s movement toward greater doctrinal consistency has contributed to what Professor Lindsay characterizes as the “disaggregation” of immigration law. He offers two contemporary decisions as examples. In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court found itself

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21. See infra text accompanying notes 34–36 (discussing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Kerry v. Din).
22. See Johnson, supra note 10, at 78–81, 86–91.
27. See Lindsay, supra note 17, at 226–39.
unable to simply ignore the divergence between ordinary constitutional law and sanction the indefinite detention of a noncitizen without any judicial review. Consequently, it interpreted the immigration statute to avoid invoking the plenary power doctrine and allowed for judicial review. Similarly, the Court in Padilla v. Kentucky found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel could not be artificially constricted so as to not require an attorney to advise a noncitizen of the immigration consequences of a criminal conviction—namely, possible removal from the United States—pursuant to a plea agreement.

In Disaggregating “Immigration Law,” Professor Lindsay analyzes one of the techniques employed by the Supreme Court for normalizing immigration law. In fact, the Court seems to be slowly moving in the direction of making constitutional immigration law consistent with mainstream law. In that vein, it has applied ordinary statutory interpretation and administrative law principles in immigration cases. Generally applicable procedural due process doctrine has become the accepted norm in immigration removal cases. All in all, the pressure to bring the cases of immigrants and immigration into the mainstream shows few signs of abating.

The mainstreaming of immigration law is far from complete, however. In fact, the Supreme Court continues to struggle with the elimination of the plenary power doctrine. In Kerry v. Din, for example, the Court avoided addressing the question of the continued vitality of the doctrine of consular nonreviewability, a close cousin of the plenary power doctrine, which immunizes from judicial review the

29. Id. at 682; see supra text accompanying notes 8–9. Two years later, the Court stepped back from its holding in Zadvydas in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 522, 531 (2003), and upheld the detention of an immigrant convicted of a crime while awaiting removal. See Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION STORIES 343, 344–45 (David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (contending that the Court’s decision in Demore v. Kim was a product of the post-September 11, 2001 “war on terror,” and the Court was reluctant to interfere with the U.S. government’s detention of noncitizens who it viewed as a threat to public safety).
31. See Lindsay, supra note 17, at 224–61.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 21–25.
33. See supra text accompanying note 11 (noting that the Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has required that removal proceedings comply with Due Process); Joseph Landau, Due Process and the Non-Citizen: A Revolution Reconsidered, 47 CONN. L. REV. 879, 895–911 (2015) (contending that the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence has produced a body of law weakening immigration and national security exceptionalism); see also Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law: Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625, 1656–79 (1992) (analyzing reliance by the Supreme Court in immigration cases on procedural due process norms as “surrogates” for substantive constitutional protections).
34. 135 S. Ct. 2128 (2015).
visa decisions of State Department consular officers. The doctrine is hopelessly out of step with modern due process law, which requires judicial review of almost all governmental decisions in which a person’s property or liberty interests are at stake.

In the October 2016 Term, the Court has the opportunity to address the continuing vitality of the plenary power doctrine. The question presented is the constitutionality of a federal law that, for purposes of U.S. citizenship, treats a child born abroad whose father is a U.S. citizen differently from (and more negatively than) a child born abroad whose mother is a U.S. citizen. Such a gender-based distinction in all likelihood would not survive minimal review if found in virtually any law other than an immigration and nationality law. Applying Professor Lindsay’s concept of disaggregation, the Court simply could place the case into the gender discrimination category, remove it from exceptional immigration law, and invalidate the gender distinction.

Professor Lindsay ultimately raises the all-important question whether there should be an “exceptional” body of immigration constitutional law at all. By increasingly applying ordinary principles of judicial review to immigration matters and narrowing the definition of “immigration laws” subject to deferential review, the Supreme Court has begun the process of dismantling immigration exceptionalism. Professor Lindsay’s analysis suggests that the end of the plenary power doctrine is simply a matter of time.


