IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PUBLIC OUTCRY: ZONING OUT SEX 
OFFENDERS THROUGH RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS IN 
FLORIDA

Steven J. Wernick* 

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I. INTRODUCTION

On January 11, 2006, William Smith Jr., a sixty-five-year-old convicted sex offender, moved into a small wooden house behind a daycare center in Ocala, Florida. His housewarming, however, was short-lived. The day after Smith moved in, local police officers arrived at his house and informed him that he would have to find another place to call home. Under a new city ordinance, sex offenders guilty of crimes against children under the age of sixteen are prohibited from living within 1,500 feet of locations where children gather. When Smith failed to take steps to change his residence, on January 30, 2006, he became the first person arrested under Ocala’s residence restrictions.

Ocala is not the only place where sex offenders face restrictions on where they may reside. Twenty different states and a spate of local governments have turned to residential buffer zones as a possible method of preventing sex crimes against children. Expanding upon registration

1. Millard K. Ives, Police Arrest Sex Felon Living Near Daycare, STAR-BANNER, Jan. 31, 2006, at A1. Smith had been convicted in Miami in 1990 of sexual battery on a child under the age of thirteen. Id. Throughout this Note, the term “sex offender” is used to describe a broad class of sex offenders, including any person who has been convicted of a sex crime, regardless of the severity of the crime or likelihood of reoffending. Conversely, the term “sexual predator” is used sparingly to refer to only those repeat offenders who have been classified as more dangerous offenders under the law.
2. Id.
3. Id.
5. Ives, supra note 1, at A1. While police officers sat down with Smith and pointed out potential residences in Ocala on a map, Smith claimed that he could not afford to move until he received his pending government check. Id.
6. Id.
laws aimed at keeping tabs on previously convicted sex offenders, state lawmakers have enacted residence restrictions prohibiting sex offenders from living near schools and other child-centered facilities. Not satisfied with existing state legislation, numerous municipalities have passed or are considering laws imposing even harsher restrictions. In the spirit of the Not in My Backyard (NIMBY) movement, these laws often appear to be an attempt by towns, cities, counties, and other local governments to expel sex offenders altogether.

Proponents of residence restrictions argue that there is no cure for sex offenders and that sex offenders have a high rate of recidivism that makes them a potential threat forever. Opponents counter that recent studies show no causal link between proximity of sex offenders to children and the propensity of recidivism. Despite evidence that residence restrictions

9. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2006) (prohibiting sex offenders convicted of sexual battery, lewd or lascivious conduct, sexual performance involving a child, or the selling of a child, from living within 1,000 feet of a school, day-care facility, park, or playground when the victim of the offense was under the age of sixteen). For a list of other states that have enacted residence restrictions, see statutes cited infra note 60.
10. See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 7, at § 79D.07[2][h].
11. See Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1831, 1850 (2005). Teichman asserts that jurisdictions often adopt harsh policies aimed at driving unwanted persons or activities away, especially when neighboring jurisdictions are engaging in the same policies. Id. “[S]uch laws and policies are another example of what has become known as Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) legislation, which aims to remove unwanted activities to other jurisdictions.” Id.
12. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 707 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005) (relaying the testimony of a psychologist that “‘there are never any guarantees that they might not reoffend’” and that “there are ‘very high rates of re-offense for sex offenders who had offended against children’”); Samantha Imber, Sexual Offenses: Prohibit Sexual Predators from Residing Within Proximity of Schools or Areas Where Minors Congregate, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 100, 101 (2003) (stating that restrictions on locations of residence are necessary because sex offenders are “virtually impossible to rehabilitate and these crimes are so difficult to detect and control”); Steve Thompson, Sex Offender Law Criticized for Increasing Risk, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 16, 2004, at B1, available at http://www.sptimes.com/2004/05/16/news-fl/Pasco/Sex_offender_law_crit.shtml (quoting Florida State Senator Mike Fasano as stating that “[n]o longer will the worst of the worst be allowed to live anywhere near a location where children spend most of their waking lives”).
13. See Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Facts About Adult Sex Offenders, http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter ATSA Policy Statement]. In fact, opponents argue that sex offenders may be more likely to reoffend under these residence restrictions because of emotional distress associated with being segregated from society and lack of access to treatment. MINN. DEP’T OF CORR., LEVEL THREE SEX OFFENDERS RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT ISSUES: 2003 REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE 9-10 (2003) (revised Feb. 2004) (finding such problems with residence restrictions as “a high concentration of
may be missing the mark when it comes to preventing sex crimes involving child victims, courts are typically reluctant to interfere with state legislatures on how best to protect the health and safety of their citizens. In light of the Eighth Circuit’s ruling in Doe v. Miller and the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant certiorari, it seems unlikely that Florida’s current legislation will succumb to constitutional challenges.

The recent upsurge in municipal efforts to enact even stricter residence restrictions, however, is cause for concern. These municipal ordinances may be pre-empted by, or in conflict with, state law when the state has already occupied the field. Most importantly, and from a policy perspective, tougher residence restrictions may not solve the problem. Even if these ordinances are constitutional on their face, the myopic race to exclude sex offenders from communities could potentially increase their propensity to reoffend.

The Florida Legislature is continuously re-thinking its comprehensive approach to the sex offender problem. This Note evaluates Florida’s

14. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441-42 (1985) (“[W]here individuals in the group affected by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to implement, the courts have been very reluctant . . . to closely scrutinize legislative choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued.”).

15. 405 F.3d 700.


17. See Amy Sherman & Nikki Waller, Creating a ‘Devil’s Island,’ MIAMI HERALD, May 30, 2005, at 1B.

18. See Monica Davey, Time Served: Barring the Unwanted, Iowa’s Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2006, at A1 (summarizing the argument that residency restrictions are ineffective because they increase homelessness and clustering of sex offenders).

19. See, e.g., H.B. 91, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools, day-care facilities, parks, playgrounds, public school bus stops, or “other places where children regularly congregate”); H.B. 251, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (expressly permitting counties and municipalities to create residence restrictions independent from state law); H.B. 591, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from living “within 1,500 feet of any school, day-care center, park, playground, library, or other business or place where children regularly congregate”); S.B. 768, 108th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools, day-care facilities, parks, playgrounds, public school bus stops, or other places where children regularly congregate and defining “within 2,500 feet” as being measured as a straight line between two property boundary lines). Although none of these bills were enacted into law during the 2006 Florida legislative session, a number of state legislators have continued to discuss strengthening laws against sex
residence restrictions against sex offenders in light of the most recent developments in the courts and discusses potential solutions to protecting these restrictions against litigation. This Note will proceed with a background on sex crimes, discussing the progression of restrictive legislation aimed at sex offenders, from registration and notification laws to new laws that effectively quarantine sex offenders from certain neighborhoods. This Note will then address constitutional challenges faced by state and local governments and the recent holding in *Doe v. Miller*, upholding the legitimacy of these laws.

In the wake of *Doe v. Miller*, this Note will analyze Florida’s approach to residence restrictions against sex offenders and the likelihood that these buffer zones will withstand judicial scrutiny. Even assuming that states and local governments will be afforded broad discretion, there are several concerns that must be addressed to protect against as-applied challenges and to create more effective laws, including the potential conflict between state and local laws. This Note will conclude with a proposal for creating uniform legislation that withstands judicial scrutiny while effectuating the legislative purpose of protecting children from future harm.

II. PROGRESSION OF LEGISLATION AIMED AT SEX OFFENDERS

A. Stranger Danger: The Sex Offender Problem

Sex crimes have long been considered among the most monstrous offenses in society, especially when the victims are children. More often than not, victims of sex crimes are under the age of eighteen. In addition

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20. The term “sex crimes” includes a number of different offenses involving sexual violence and exploitation. For a listing of those crimes involving children, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 943.0435 (1)(a) (West 2006) (identifying a sex offender as a person who has committed, attempted, or conspired to commit kidnapping, false imprisonment, luring or enticing a child under the age of twelve, sexual battery, procuring child for prostitution, indecent exposure, sexual exploitation of a minor, obscenity, involvement in pornography, and the selling and buying of minors).


22. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, *SEX OFFENSES AND OFFENDERS* 24 (1997) [hereinafter *SEX OFFENSES*] (finding that a majority of sexual assault victims in 1995 were under the age of eighteen). “Victims of sexual assault were the youngest victims among those
to suffering physical harm, child victims of sex crimes suffer psychological injuries with enormous long-term impacts on these young victims, their families, and even society at large.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, the victimization of children is an even greater problem than many people perceive, considering that many sex crimes go unreported.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite evidence that the majority of sex crimes involving children are committed by friends and family members,\textsuperscript{25} extensive media coverage of child abductions has drawn significant attention to “stranger danger”\textsuperscript{26} and contributed to a rising fear of habitual sex offenders.\textsuperscript{27} Because there is no commonly recognized cure for sex offenders,\textsuperscript{28} and because research persons described by incarcerated violent state prisoners. The median age of the victims of imprisoned sexual assaulters was less than [thirteen] years old.” \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{23} See Berliner, \textit{supra} note 8, at 1206 (asserting that research has shown that victims of sex crimes are more likely to develop Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder); Lieb et al., \textit{supra} note 21, at 45-46 (examining whether sex offenders should be treated as a special class of offenders). While the nature of the offense and level of violence involved will surely alter the impacts on each individual victim, the sexual component of sex offenses involves a personal invasion inherently different from other crimes that leads to enhanced psychological harm. \textit{Id.} at 48. For an examination of the effects on society, see Larry K. Brown, M.D. et al., \textit{Impact of Sexual Abuse on the HIV-Risk-Related Behavior of Adolescents in Intensive Psychiatric Treatment}, 157 \textit{AM. J. PSYCHIATRY} 1413-15 (2000) (finding that sexually abused adolescents were more likely to contract STDs and were more likely to engage in types of behavior related to HIV infection); \textit{Sex Offenses, supra} note 22, at 23 (finding that in a study of state prison inmates “[s]exual assault offenders were substantially more likely than any other category of offenders to report having experienced physical or sexual abuse while growing up”).

\textsuperscript{24} See National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Frequently Asked Questions and Statistics, http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry=en_US&PageId=242#3a (last visited Sept. 4, 2006) (stating that “[s]tatistics show that 1 in 5 girls and 1 in 10 boys are sexually exploited before they reach adulthood, yet less than 35% of those child sexual assaults are reported to authorities”).


\textsuperscript{26} See Cory Reiss, \textit{Dealing with the Sex Offenders: Many Politicians Talk Tough, but From There, the Solutions Aren’t Easy}, \textit{SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.}, June 14, 2005, at B1 (stating that “stranger danger” gets the most press and is the driving force behind most of the legislation against sex offenders).

\textsuperscript{27} See Caroline Louise Lewis, \textit{The Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act: An Unconstitutional Deprivation of the Right to Privacy and Substantive Due Process}, 31 \textit{HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.} 89, 89, 92 (1996) (reciting the tragic stories of Megan Kanka and Jacob Wetterling as the impetus for laws requiring sex offender registration); Lisa Henderson, \textit{Comment, Sex Offenders: You are Now Free to Move About the Country. An Analysis of Doe v. Miller’s Effects on Sex Offender Residential Restrictions}, 73 \textit{UMKC L. REV.} 797, 801-02 (2005) (noting that in reaction to “media induced fears, the public . . . insists these offenders be immediately removed from society and harsher laws [be] enacted to prevent such atrocities”).

\textsuperscript{28} ATSA Policy Statement, \textit{supra} note 13.
suggests that sex offenders have a higher rate of recidivism than non-sex offenders, there is a persistent perception that every child is a potential victim to the stranger lurking around the corner. The array of media attention directed toward sex crimes and their perpetrators, in the form of news reports and television programming, has propelled this perception forward and generated a climate of intolerance towards sex offenders in the community.

Growing concern has prompted more than a decade of legislation to counter sex crimes against children. This legislation has progressed from laws focused on identifying sex offenders and notifying the public, to laws that literally remove certain offenders from a community altogether. One thing is obvious from the progression of legislation against sex offenders: As long as courts remain deferential to legislatures, lawmakers are continuously willing to revamp these laws to alleviate public anxiety.

B. Identification and Notification Laws

In reaction to public concerns for children’s safety, both individual
states and the federal government have enacted laws aimed at identifying sex offenders and notifying communities of their whereabouts. In 1994, partially in response to the abduction of eleven-year-old Jacob Wetterling in Minnesota, Congress passed a federal law requiring all sex offenders to register with local law enforcement and submit information on their permanent residence. In 1996, in the wake of the murder of seven-year-old Megan Kanka in New Jersey, President Bill Clinton signed “Megan’s Law,” which added a requirement that states create notification protocols that provide public access to information on registered sex offenders. By August 1996, all fifty states and the District of Columbia had enacted their own version of Megan’s Law, and many states now have websites to disseminate information to the public. Sex offenders challenged these laws, arguing that they constituted retroactive punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In 2003, in *Smith v. Doe*, the Supreme Court upheld registration laws as valid state regulatory schemes and concluded that information about sexual predators may be posted on the Internet.

34. See Jacob Wetterling Foundation, The Jacob Wetterling Story, http://www.jwf.org/ReadArticle.asp?articleId=34 (last visited Sept. 4, 2006). Jacob Wetterling was an eleven-year-old boy from St. Joseph, Minnesota who was kidnapped in 1989 on his way home from a convenience store. *Id.* This case served as a wakeup call for law enforcement agencies that, at the time, did not have comprehensive lists of sex offenders from which to start an investigation.


42. *Id.* at 105-06 (finding that the law did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the
In 1995, Florida lawmakers amended the Florida Sexual Predators Act to require sexual predators to register with law enforcement and authorizing law enforcement to notify communities of their presence.43 Under the Act, sexual predators must register with the Department of Law Enforcement and maintain that registration for the rest of their lives.44 Once a sexual predator registers, local law enforcement agencies are required to disseminate information about the offender’s description, crimes committed, and current residence.45

Those offenders not included under the Florida Sexual Predators Act are subject to virtually the same requirements under the Sex Offender Act. Adopted in 1997, the Sex Offender Act requires sex offenders to register with their local sheriffs’ offices within forty-eight hours of release from custody or relocation into Florida and to maintain registration for life.46 The major difference between the two acts is that under the Sex Offender Act, community notification by law enforcement agencies is not mandatory.47

Registration and notification provisions in both the Florida Sexual

Alaska Legislature intended a sex offender registration law to operate as a civil regulatory scheme rather than criminal punishment). Furthermore, the Court determined that use of the Internet to disseminate information to the public was a legitimate way to effectuate public safety and “the attendant humiliation is but a collateral consequence of a valid regulation.” Id. at 99.

43. 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96-388 (West) (as codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.21 (2005)). Sexual predators are designated as those persons committing felony sex crimes in Florida, those persons labeled sexual predators in other states, and those persons who have been labeled predators through civil commitment. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(4) & (5) (2005).

44. FLA. STAT. § 775.21(6). Information required includes a sex offender’s name, social security number, age, race, sex, date of birth, height, weight, hair and eye color, and all permanent and temporary addresses. Id.

45. Id. § 775.21(7).

[T]he sheriff of the county or the chief of police of the municipality where the sexual predator temporarily or permanently resides shall notify each licensed day care center, elementary school, middle school, and high school within a 1-mile radius of the temporary or permanent residence of the sexual predator of the presence of the sexual predator.

Id.

46. 1997 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 97-299 (West) (as codified at FLA. STAT. § 943.0435 (2005)). Under the Sex Offender Act, sexual offenders are defined as persons who have committed, or attempted, solicited, or conspired to commit kidnapping, false imprisonment, luring or enticing a child under the age of twelve, sexual battery, procuring a child for prostitution, indecent exposure, sexual exploitation of a minor, obscenity, involvement in pornography, and the selling and buying of minors. FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(1)(a) (2005). Sex offenders are also persons who have been designated as sexual predators in another state. Id.

47. Compare FLA. STAT. § 943.0435(7)(a)(2) (2005), with id. § 775.21.
Predators Act and the Sex Offender Act have withstood judicial scrutiny.\(^{48}\) In 2003, in response to a conflict between the Second and Third District Courts of Appeal,\(^{49}\) the Florida Supreme Court held that the Sexual Predators Act was constitutionally valid because it did not violate procedural due process or separation of powers.\(^{50}\) In 2005, faced with a class action suit challenging the legitimacy of the Sex Offender Act, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the Act, holding that the registration provisions did not violate due process, equal protection, right to travel, or separation of powers.\(^{51}\)

Clamping down on sex offenders continues to be a hot-button issue in Florida and lawmakers have developed more creative ways to protect against future offenses. In 1998, the Florida Legislature passed the Jimmy Ryce Involuntary Civil Commitment for Sexually Violent Predators’ Treatment and Care Act,\(^{52}\) establishing civil commitment procedures for those sexual predators with mental disorders that increase their likelihood of reoffending.\(^{53}\) In 2005, the Florida Legislature tightened up laws against sex offenders, passing the Jessica Lunsford Act.\(^{54}\) The Act increases the mandatory prison term for sex crimes against children younger than twelve from ten to twenty-five years.\(^{55}\) The Act also requires certain offenders

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\(^{48}\) Milks v. State, 894 So. 2d 924, 925 (Fla. 2005); Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1349 (11th Cir. 2005).

\(^{49}\) Compare Milks v. State, 848 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (upholding the Florida Sexual Predator Act), with Espindola v. State, 855 So. 2d 1281 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (striking down the Florida Sexual Predator Act on grounds that it violated procedural due process rights).

\(^{50}\) Milks, 894 So. 2d at 925. The Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict, stating that the existence of a prior conviction is the only material fact under the Florida Sexual Predators Act, and both defendants received “a procedurally safeguarded opportunity” to contest that fact. Id. at 928 (citing Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003)).

\(^{51}\) Moore, 410 F.3d at 1349.

\(^{52}\) 1998 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 98-64 (West) (codified as amended at Fla. STAT. §§ 394.910–930 (2005)).

\(^{53}\) The Act authorizes the state attorney, following a written assessment and recommendation by experts, to file a petition stating that a person is a sexually violent predator who should be confined to civil commitment. Fla. STAT. § 394.914 (2005). A person may be subjected to civil commitment only upon determination by clear and convincing evidence that the person is a sexually violent predator. Id. § 394.917. The Act requires that a person committed have a mental examination at least once every year to determine whether to continue holding that person involuntarily. Id. § 394.918.


\(^{55}\) Fla. STAT. § 775.082 (3)(a) (2005). For a life felony committed on or after September 1, 2005, which is a violation of Fla. STAT. § 800.04 (5) (referring to lewd or lascivious molestation of a victim less than twelve years old), the offender is to be punished by:

a. A term of imprisonment for life; or

b. A split sentence that is a term of not less than 25 years imprisonment and not exceeding life imprisonment, followed by probation or community control for
placed on conditional release supervision to be monitored by global satellite positioning devices for the rest of their lives. Additionally, the Act authorizes prosecutors to file felony charges against anyone who knowingly helps a sex offender avoid reporting requirements, including failure to report non-compliance.

C. Development of Residence Restrictions

In 1996, Florida became the first state to enact statewide residence restrictions against sexual predators whose victims were children. In 1999, Alabama was the first state to extend those restrictions to a broad class of sex offenders. Since then, at least twenty states have enacted residence restrictions, in one form or another, prohibiting sex offenders from living within a specified distance from schools and other child-centered facilities.

the remainder of the person’s natural life as provided in s. 948.012 (4).
States take different approaches to defining the category of offenders subject to these residence restrictions. For example, Louisiana’s residence restrictions apply only to those offenders deemed “sexually violent predators,” while Ohio includes a broader group, restricting any “person who has been convicted of, is convicted of, has pleaded guilty to, or pleads guilty to either a sexually oriented offense that is not a registration-exempt . . . offense or a child-victim oriented offense.” As discussed in more detail in Part III, Florida maintains two different residence restrictions: one for sexual predators and one for general sex offenders.

States also vary in their methods of punishing offenders who knowingly violate the residence restrictions. The majority of states impose criminal penalties for violations, with some states applying uniform penalties and others imposing punishment based on the sex offender’s previous conviction. Ohio, however, merely provides for injunctive

persons required to register as sex offenders from residing within “student safety zones”—equivalent to 1,000 feet from a school); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 566.147 (2005) (“Any person who has . . . been convicted of . . . [certain sexual crimes against minors] shall not establish residency within one thousand feet of any public school, . . . any private school, . . . or child care facility”); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.16 (2006) (prohibiting registered sex offenders from “knowingly” residing with 1,000 feet of any school or child-care center); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2950.031(A) (LexisNexis 2005) (prohibiting any sex offender from residing within 2,000 feet of a school); 57 Okl. Stat. Ann. tit. 57, § 590 (2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a public school site or educational institution); Or. Rev. Stat. § 144.642(1)(a) (2005) (authorizing the Department of Corrections to adopt rules including a “general prohibition against allowing a sex offender to reside in any dwelling, with the exception of a treatment facility or halfway house, near locations where children are the primary occupants or users”); S.D. Codified Laws § 22-24B-23 (Michie 2006) (prohibiting sex offenders from residing or loitering within 500 feet of any school, public park, playground, or pool); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-39-211(a) (2005) (prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a school, child-care facility, or day-care center); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12 (13B) (Vernon 2005) (“If . . . a child . . . was the victim of the offense, the judge shall [require] that the defendant not . . . go in, on, or within 1,000 feet of a premises where children commonly gather . . . .”); W. Va. Code § 62-12-26(b)(1) (2006) (prohibiting certain paroled sex offenders from residing or working “within one thousand feet of a school or child care facility . . .”). In addition to current statewide restrictions, at least two states have enacted enabling legislation, giving local governments authorization to enact residence restrictions. See, e.g., Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-4017 (2006) (“A political subdivision may enact an ordinance, resolution, or other legal restriction prescribing where sex offenders may reside” so long as “the restrictions are limited to sexual predators, extend no more than five hundred feet from a school or child care facility” and do not apply to retroactively or to sexual predators who reside in state-owned prisons or correctional facilities); S.B. 6325, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006) (enabling Washington cities to create statewide standards for imposing residence restrictions).

relief, allowing neighbors and local prosecutors to petition the courts to forcibly remove sex offenders from buffer zones.65

Local governments have enacted their own residence restrictions. Many have taken action because their constituents feel that statewide restrictions are inadequate to combat against the threat of sex offenders living near schools and other child-centered facilities.66 While some have tailored ordinances to avoid litigation and ensure that the restrictions apply to only the most dangerous offenders,67 the majority of local governments appear to be more focused on creating broad buffer zones that leave limited options for sex offenders to find housing.68 Regardless, many local officials admit that they feel pressure to enact some sort of legislation when neighboring towns and cities have already acted.69

Surely there is a legitimate and important purpose behind residence restrictions: to prevent convicted sex offenders from committing further crimes against children.70 Lawmakers believe that by restricting access to

punishable by up to five years imprisonment when the violator was previously convicted of a first degree felony; but making a violation a misdemeanor of the first degree punishable by up no more than one year imprisonment and/or a fine of up to $1,000).

65. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2950.031(B) (West 2006) (providing that when an offender violates the provisions of the statute, an owner or lessee of real property within a 1,000 foot buffer or the prosecuting attorney for the municipality with jurisdiction over the area affected shall have “a cause of action for injunctive relief against the person”).

66. See Karen Sloan, Bluffs Sex Offenders on the Move Where Can They Live? ‘Really Nowhere’ Left, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Oct. 18, 2005, at 01A (stating that the City of Des Moines, in response to concerns over sex offenders’ potential residence locations, passed a stricter ordinance to extend the 2,000-foot restriction “to include parks, swimming pools, libraries and recreational trails”); Davey, supra note 18, at A1 (stating that Galena, Illinois passed a local ordinance to prevent Iowa’s sex offenders from finding refuge across the border).

67. See Michael Pritchard, Mullica Twp. Restricts Where Sex Offenders Can Live, PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, Jan. 26, 2006, at C4 (stating that Mullica Township, New Jersey created a less restrictive ordinance that only applies to Tier II and III sex offenders and does not bar sex offenders from living near bus stops).

68. See Jim Saunders, Lawmakers Want State to Create Uniformity in Sex Predator Rules, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-JOURNAL, Oct. 20, 2005, at 1C (detailing the efforts of a number of municipalities in Florida that have enacted buffer zones above and beyond the 1,000-foot statewide restrictions).

69. See Pritchard, supra note 67, at C4 (quoting a local official as saying “[w]e didn’t want to be the only town without such an ordinance and then actually finding ourselves to be attracting sex offenders to the township”).

70. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (stating that the Iowa General Assembly enacted legislation creating residence restrictions on sex offenders “in an effort to protect children in Iowa from the risk that convicted sex offenders may reoffend in locations close to their residences”; Ga. House Daily Report, 2003 Reg. Sess. No. 37 (Ga. 2003) (documenting the unanimous vote to pass residence restrictions “designed to protect [Georgia’s] youngest and most vulnerable citizens”); see also Ian Demsky, Sex Offenders Live Near Many Schools, Day Cares, TENNESSEAN, July 18, 2005, at A1 (quoting Tennessee District Attorney John Carney, who helped draft state legislation, as saying that “[t]he primary purpose is to protect children” and that “[i]t all boils down to the specific
schools and other places where children congregate, sex offenders will have less interaction with children and be less able to act on their impulses to reoffend.71 Residence restrictions are thus another weapon in the prophylactic arsenal of laws enacted to reduce the overall number of crimes against children.72 Though there is no evidence to prove that these laws have any impact on the number of offenses committed,73 several state legislatures are taking steps to expand their restrictions to cover additional places where children gather and to increase buffer zones to upwards of 2,500 feet.74

III. RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS IN FLORIDA

A. State Legislation

Florida is among the twenty states that have enacted statewide residence restrictions on sex offenders. Florida’s restrictions are unique. While a majority of these states have enacted one statute to deal with a single category of offenders,75 Florida has taken a dual-category approach,

fact that sex offenders tend to continue to commit assaults”).

71. Imber, supra note 12, at 101.

72. Henderson, supra note 27, at 798-99 (stating that many supporters view statutes as “prophylactic measures enacted to reduce the total number of sex offenses committed”).

73. ATSA Policy Statement, supra note 13 (positing that “there is no research to support the idea that residence restrictions prevent repeat sex crimes”); Levenson & Cotter, supra note 13, at 174-75 (finding that an overwhelming majority of sex offenders in Florida perceived residence restrictions to be ineffective in altering the risk of reoffending).

74. See, e.g., H.B. 91, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (proposing amendments to Florida’s law that: (1) increase the buffer zone from 1,000 feet to 2,500 feet; (2) include public school bus stops; and (3) increase the number of affected sex offenders by including sex offenders whose victims were under the age of 18); H.B. 157, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2006) (proposing amendments to Kentucky’s law that would increase the buffer zone from 1,000 to 1,500 feet); S.B. 6, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2006) (proposing amendments to Indiana’s law that would remove possibility of parole board exceptions and would require predators to wear electronic monitoring devices). California legislators have turned to the initiative process in hopes of sweeping reforms to statewide restrictions against sex offenders. Endorsed by Democrats and Republicans alike, including Governor Schwarzenegger, Proposition 83 could very well spark a national trend if voters approve the new measure, which prohibits all released sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or park and provides for lifetime monitoring through electronic tracking devices. See Jennifer Warren, Sex Offender Crackdown Measure Ties into a National Trend, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2006, 2006 WLNR 16159743.

75. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-14-128(a) (2005) (applying residence prohibitions against “sex offender[s] . . . required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act of 1997, §12-12-901 et seq.”); Iowa Code Ann. § 692A.2A (West 2005) (designating persons subject to the provisions as “person[s] who [have] committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor”).
providing for one set of restrictions applying to sex offenders\textsuperscript{76} and another more stringent set of restrictions for a small group of sexual predators.\textsuperscript{77}

1. Restrictions Against General Sex Offenders

During the 2004 legislative session, the Florida Legislature passed a law that prohibits certain sex offenders from residing “within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park or playground.”\textsuperscript{78} In tailoring the statute to effectuate the goal of protecting children, these restrictions apply only to those sex offenders committing offenses on or after October 1, 2004, whose victims were under the age of sixteen at the time of the crime.\textsuperscript{79} Offenders who violate the law are subject to two potential criminal penalties. A violator whose qualifying conviction was classified as a first-degree felony or higher is charged with committing a third-degree felony.\textsuperscript{80} A violator whose qualifying conviction was less than a first-degree felony is charged with committing a first-degree misdemeanor.\textsuperscript{81}

On its face, § 794.065 works to both broaden and narrow the category of offenders included within its grasp. First, these residence restrictions apply regardless of whether a sex offender has served any time behind bars.\textsuperscript{82} This broadens the scope of the statute, potentially including sex offenders who cut deals to stay out of jail and offenders with suspended sentences. Second, these residence restrictions apply only to those offenders who were convicted of offenses committed on or after October 1, 2004.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, the statute applies prospectively, and thereby narrows the category of offenders by exempting a whole host of past offenders from

\textsuperscript{76} FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
\textsuperscript{77} Id. § 947.1405.
\textsuperscript{79} It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of s. 794.011, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0145, regardless of whether adjudication has been withheld, in which the victim of the offense was less than 16 years of age, to reside within 1,000 feet of any school, day care center, park, or playground.
\textsuperscript{80} FLA. STAT. § 794.065(1) (2005). The restrictions created under § 794.065 apply to sex offenders convicted of sexual battery (§ 794.011); lewd or lascivious offenses (§ 800.04); sexual performance by a child (§ 827.071); or selling or buying of minors (§ 847.0145). Id.
\textsuperscript{81} Id.
\textsuperscript{82} Id. “It is unlawful for any person who has been convicted of a violation of s. 794.011, s. 800.04, s. 827.071, or s. 847.0145, regardless of whether adjudication has been withheld.” Id. (emphasis added)
\textsuperscript{83} Id. § 794.065(2).
the restrictions.84

2. Restrictions Against Sexual Predators

Within the same bill, the Florida Legislature amended the Conditional Release Program Act to include even stricter residence restrictions against a smaller group of offenders labeled sexual predators.85 Originally drafted in 1996, § 947.1405(7)(a) prohibited sexual predators subject to conditional release supervision from “living within 1,000 feet of a school, daycare center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate.”86 In 2004, the Florida Legislature added to § 947.1405(7)(a), prohibiting sexual predators from living within 1,000 feet of a public school bus stop.87 Persons subject to these restrictions are those sex offenders who were convicted of the same qualifying crimes included in § 794.065,88 and have been labeled sexual predators under § 775.21 because of their enhanced threat to society.89 The restrictions under § 947.1405 apply to those sexual predators convicted of a crime committed on or after October 1, 1995, whose victims were under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.90

These restrictions are more severe than those placed on general sex offenders. Sexual predators subject to § 947.1405 are still under the supervision of the Department of Corrections.91 Rather than going through the courts, violations are assessed by the Parole Commission.92 The most...

84. The Florida Legislature likely limited the application of residence restrictions to future offenders to ensure that the restrictions would withstand challenges that the restrictions amounted to an ex post facto law. See Fla. Senate Staff, Senate Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement on S.B. 120, 4-5 (Fla. 2004) (noting that Fla. Stat. § 794.065, as enacted, will not face ex post facto challenges because it does not apply retroactively).
85. 2004 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2004-55 (West). “If the victim was under the age of 18, a prohibition on living within 1,000 feet of a school, day care center, park, playground, designated public school bus stop, or other place where children regularly congregate.” Fla. Stat. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added). In 2004, the Florida Department of Corrections predicted that only about thirty-five offenders would be subject to the residence restrictions under § 947.1405(7)(a). Thompson, supra note 12, at B1.
86. 1996 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 96-388 (West).
88. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (discussing four different types of crimes).
89. Fla. Stat. § 775.21(3)(a) (2005). “Repeat sexual offenders, sexual offenders who use physical violence, and sexual offenders who prey on children are sexual predators who present an extreme threat to the public safety.” Id.
90. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).
91. Id.
92. See id. § 947.141(4) (detailing the procedure by which the Parole Commission determines the consequences when a sexual predator violates the terms of § 947.1405(7)(a)(2)). One potential consequence of a violation is that a sexual predator may lose his right to continue in the Conditional Release Program and return to prison to finish the remainder of his term. Id.
significant provision within the residence restrictions themselves is the inclusion of public school bus stops and “other place[s] where children regularly congregate” within the buffer zone. Considering that public school bus stops are numerous and typically located in residential areas where children live too far away to walk to school, restrictions faced by sexual predators cover enormous ground and prohibit them from living in some of Florida’s most remote areas as well.

B. Local Ordinances

Towns, cities, counties, and other local governments around Florida have jumped into the fray, enacting even stricter regulations than those imposed by the State to effectively push these undesirable offenders out of the community. Prompted in 2005 by the murder of Jessica Lunsford in central Florida and the Miller decision in April of that same year, local residence restrictions have appeared rapidly throughout the state.

Following the lead of the city of Miami Beach, local governments in

93. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).

94. See id. § 234.01 (mandating Florida school boards to provide transportation for students whose homes are more than a “reasonable walking distance” from the student’s assigned school). For further explanation, see FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 6A-3.001 (2006) (defining “reasonable walking distance” as “any distance not more than two (2) miles between the home and school or one and one-half (1 1/2) miles between the home and the assigned bus stop”). For information on the sheer number of bus stops, see Thompson, supra note 12, at B1 (stating that Pinellas County alone has over 15,000 public school bus stops).

95. However, the legislature added a caveat to § 947.1405 regarding public school bus stops that protects sexual predators who have pre-established residences. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005). While sexual predators subject to the Conditional Release Program are prohibited from moving within 1,000 feet of an established bus stop, school districts are prohibited from creating new bus stops and are required to move any existing bus stops within the same distance of any predators already maintaining a residence before October 1, 2004. Id. Interestingly, this provision creates reverse buffer zones against school districts, blocking off certain areas that otherwise may be ideal candidates for public school bus stops. Thompson, supra note 12, at B1 (detailing the difficulties faced by school districts in locating new bus stops as a result of this law).

96. Manuel Roig-Franzia, Miami Beach Mayor Seeks to Exclude Sex Offenders, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2005, at A03 (discussing the murder of Jessica Lunsford, a nine-year-old girl from central Florida who was found dead with her hands bound on Mar. 19, 2005).

97. Supra note 15 and accompanying text.

98. See FLA. H.R. STAFF, H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91, at 4 (2005) [hereinafter H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91] (stating that “[a]s of October 17, 2005, of the 153 municipalities that responded [to the Committee’s survey], 50 municipalities indicated that they had passed ordinances and 14 had pending proposed ordinances”); Mike Carlson, Not in My City, ORLANDO WEEKLY, Aug. 25, 2005, available at http://www.orlandoweekly.com/features/story.asp?id=8250 (stating that the City of Davie, on May 18, 2005, became the first city in Florida to formally enact a local ordinance that prohibited sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of schools).

99. Carlson, supra note 98 (stating that Miami Beach Mayor Alan Dermer began advocating for a stricter local ordinance shortly after the death of Jessica Lunsford in March). Dermer proposed
Florida have taken a much stricter approach to residence restrictions, expanding the ban from the state-mandated 1,000 feet to 2,500 feet.\textsuperscript{100} Like the majority of local governments, the City of Miami Beach has created a hybrid ordinance, placing prohibitions on general sex offenders more in line with statewide restrictions against sexual predators. The city prohibits sex offenders whose victims were under the age of sixteen from “living within 2,500 feet of a school, designated public school bus stop, day care center, park, playground, or other place[s] where children regularly congregate.”\textsuperscript{101} In addition, the city prohibits sex offenders from establishing either a permanent or temporary residence within a restricted zone.\textsuperscript{102}

While many local ordinances place additional restrictions on sex offenders above and beyond those enacted by the State, there are a couple of areas in which local ordinances are less restrictive. First, penalties imposed upon violators are not as harsh. A majority of local governments impose a small fine along with the possibility of sixty days in jail for a first offense, while a second offense commands a higher fine and the possibility of twelve months in jail.\textsuperscript{103} Second, local ordinances provide exceptions for increasing the distance to 2,500 feet, based on the statewide exclusions for adult-entertainment facilities. Id.

100. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402 (2005) (prohibiting sex offenders whose victims were under the age of sixteen from establishing a permanent or temporary residence “within 2,500 feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate”); CITY OF WINTER PARK, FLA., ORDINANCE NO. 2638-05 (2005) (prohibiting sexual offenders or predators from establishing a permanent or temporary residence within 2,500 feet of any park, school, school bus stop, day-care center, or playground).

101. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(a) (2005). The City of Miami Beach is one of many who have borrowed the terms “public school bus stop” and “other place where children regularly congregate” from the State’s residence restrictions against sexual predators. See FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(g)(2) (2005).

102. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-401.

Temporary residence means a place where the person abides, lodges, or resides for a period of 14 or more days in the aggregate during any calendar year and which is not the person’s permanent address, or a place where the person routinely abides, lodges, or resides for a period of four or more consecutive or nonconsecutive days in any month and which is not the person’s permanent residence.

Id. State residence restrictions, conversely, merely prohibit sex offenders from residing . . . , and the Florida legislature has not elaborated on what it means to reside somewhere. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).

103. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(c) (2005).

Penalties. A person who violates this section shall be punished by a fine not
sex offenders who have established a permanent residence prior to the enactment of the residence restrictions. There are also exceptions for offenders who were prosecuted as juveniles, offenders who are still juveniles, and offenders whose residence is brought into conflict with a restricted area through the creation of a school, bus stop, or other child-centered facilities.104

In an attempt to find efficient ways to ensure that sex offenders do not slip through the cracks, local governments prohibit landlords from knowingly renting any residence located within a buffer zone to sex offenders subject to residency restrictions.105 The goal of these landlord compliance provisions is to create a self-enforcement mechanism that alleviates pressure on local law enforcement agencies. This purpose is made clear by the fact that violators are typically only subject to code exceeding $500.00 or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding 60 days, or by both such fine and imprisonment; for a second or subsequent conviction of a violation of this section, such person shall be punished by a fine not to exceed $1,000.00 or imprisonment in the county jail not more than 12 months, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Id.

104. See, e.g., CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-402(d) (2005). The ordinance provides an exception for sex offenders when:

(1) The person established the permanent residence or temporary residence and reported and registered the residence pursuant to F.S. § 775.21, 943.0435 or 944.607, prior to July 1, 2005.
(2) The person was a minor when he/she committed the offense and was not convicted as an adult.
(3) The person is a minor.
(4) The school, designated public school bus stop or day care center within 2,500 of the persons permanent residence was opened after the person established the permanent residence or temporary residence and reported and registered the residence pursuant to F.S. § 775.21, 943.0435 or 944.607.

Id.

105. See, e.g., CITY OF NORTH LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-93(a) (2005).

It is unlawful to let or rent any place, structure, or part thereof, trailer or other conveyance, with the knowledge that it will be used as a permanent residence or temporary residence by any person prohibited from establishing such permanent residence pursuant to s. 134.62 of this Code, if such place, structure, or part thereof, trailer or other conveyance, is located within two thousand five hundred (2500) feet of any school, designated public school bus stop, day care center, park, playground, or other place where children regularly congregate.

Id.
enforcement provisions amounting to a slap on the wrist.\textsuperscript{106} Local governments have enacted these residence restrictions under the broad police powers conferred upon them by the State of Florida.\textsuperscript{107} Local governments cite many of the same concerns expressed by state lawmakers: that sex offenders represent an extreme threat to public safety, that offenders have a high risk of recidivism, that many sex crimes involving children go unreported, and that the repercussions of these crimes come at an unbearable cost to victims and society as a whole.\textsuperscript{108} Aiming to provide maximum protection to their citizens, local legislative bodies have borrowed state regulatory language barring adult-entertainment facilities within 2,500 feet of schools\textsuperscript{109} as a basis for expanding residence restrictions beyond the 1,000-foot statewide restrictions.\textsuperscript{110}

\textbf{IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS: \textit{DOE v. MILLER}}

While relatively new, residence restrictions have thus far withstood judicial scrutiny. State and federal courts have thrown out challenges for lack of standing,\textsuperscript{111} and several state courts of last resort have upheld the legitimacy of residence restrictions against a variety of different constitutional challenges.\textsuperscript{112} In \textit{Doe v. Miller}, the lone challenge to reach

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106} See, e.g., \textit{CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLA., ORDINANCE § 70-403(b) (2005)} (stating that violations are subject to code violation penalties).
  \item \textsuperscript{107} See \textit{FLA. CONST. art VIII, § 2(b).} “Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided by law.” Id.; see also \textit{FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3) (2005)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{108} The legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth in Art. VIII, § 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, the legislative body of each municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter upon which the state legislature may act. \textit{FLA. STAT. § 166.021(3)}; see, e.g., \textit{CITY OF NORTH LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 38-90(a) (2005)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{109} \textit{FLA. STAT. § 847.0134 (2005)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{110} \textit{See CITY OF CORAL SPRINGS, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14-1 (2005)}.
  \item \textsuperscript{112} See, e.g., \textit{State v. Seering}, 701 N.W. 2d 655, 670 (Iowa 2005) (holding that Iowa’s statute was not unconstitutional because the residency restrictions did not deprive a sex offender of his constitutionally protected rights); \textit{Mann v. State}, 603 S.E.2d 283, 285-86 (Ga. 2004) (holding that the application of Georgia statute to the petitioner did not amount to a takings violation, that the phrase child-care facility was not void for vagueness, and that the statute was not overly broad);
In accordance with a public outcry

In a federal circuit court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that nothing in the Constitution prevented Iowa from using its police powers to establish residence restrictions against sex offenders in furtherance of the health and safety of the state’s citizens. In 2002, Iowa enacted legislation that prohibited sex offenders convicted of certain offenses against a minor from residing within 2,000 feet of a school or registered child-care facility. A group of sex offenders in Iowa brought a class action suit in federal district court to challenge the legitimacy of Iowa’s new statewide residence restrictions. Declaring the restrictions unconstitutional, the district court issued a permanent injunction barring enforcement of the law. However, on April 29, 2005, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit, in Doe v. Miller, reversed the lower court’s decision and upheld Iowa’s statute as a valid use of the state’s police powers. Specifically, the court held that the Iowa statewide residence restrictions did not violate procedural due process or substantive due process, and did not amount to self-incrimination or a retroactive law in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause.

While Miller is an important case for defending the legitimacy of these laws, the legality of residence restrictions is still the subject of much debate. First, Miller was not a unanimous decision. In his dissent,

Lee v. State, 895 So. 2d 1038, 1044 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that 2,000 foot residence restrictions against sex offenders was nonpunitive and therefore, the retroactive application did not constitute a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause).

113. Miller, 405 F.3d at 704.

114. Iowa Code § 692A.2A (1) (2002) (stating that the restrictions apply to “a person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense that involved a minor”).

115. Id. § 692A.2A (2).


117. Id. at 880.

118. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 704 (8th Cir. 2005). The Eighth Circuit declined to hear the case en banc, Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2005), and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari, Doe v. Miller, 126 S. Ct. 757 (2005).

119. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709.

120. Id. at 716 (“[W]e are not persuaded that the means selected to pursue the State’s legitimate interest are without rational basis.”).

121. Id.

122. Id. at 723.

123. See H.R. Staff Analysis of H.B. 91, supra note 98, at 8-9 (2005) (stating that a proposed increase in Florida’s statewide residence restrictions to 2,500 feet will likely invite a constitutional challenge on grounds that the statute amounts to a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause); Michael J. Duster, Note, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: State Attempts to Banish Sex Offenders, 53 Drake L. Rev. 711, 778-79 (2005) (asserting that while states have acted with good intentions, residence restrictions against sex offenders have “swept away constitutional protections of substantive due process, the prohibition on ex post facto laws, and adequate notice guaranteed by procedural due process”); Henderson, supra note 27, at 811-12 (arguing that there is no
Judge Michael Melloy pointed to the *ex post facto* challenge as a serious threat to the legitimacy of these restrictions, and sowed the seeds of a future majority opinion. Second, *Miller* is only binding on those seven mid-western states within the Eighth Circuit’s reach. Finally, the Supreme Court may be waiting for the issue to percolate in the lower courts before handpicking a case. In light of these possibilities, the constitutional issues at stake in *Miller* are worthy of further discussion.

### A. Procedural Due Process

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that “no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” Procedural due process protection is primarily concerned with ensuring that when laws infringe on protected rights of individuals, the government provides adequate procedural safeguards to ensure fairness to those punished or affected by the laws. In analyzing Iowa’s residence restrictions, the court in *Miller* found that the restrictions did not deny sex offenders due process of the law.

After implicitly recognizing a liberty interest in the right to choose one’s residence, the *Miller* court addressed whether the residence supporting evidence that residence restrictions will prevent re-offenses and that state statutes apply unequally to different categories of sex offenders; *cf. supra* note 12 (summarizing the position of proponents of residence restrictions).

See *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 705.

See *id.* at 723-26 (Melloy, J., dissenting). Judge Melloy found the Iowa statute to be a punitive law in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause, but otherwise joined the majority opinion. *Id.* at 723.


See H. W. PERRY JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 249 (1991) (finding that the Supreme Court, in deciding whether to grant certiorari, often looks favorably upon a case that has had a chance to percolate in the federal appellate courts).

See *Carey v. Piphus*, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978) (“Procedural due process rules are meant to protect persons not from the deprivation, but from the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”).

See *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 709.

The first question in every procedural due process challenge is whether the government has deprived the individual of a protected interest in property or liberty. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). Since failure to find a deprivation of a protected liberty interest would have relieved the State from any requirement to provide due process, the court would not have had reason to evaluate the challenges brought by respondents. See *Paul v. Davis*, 424 U.S. 693, 700-01 (1976) (stating that due process is not required unless a deprivation of property or liberty interest has been found).
restrictions failed to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. Respondents claimed that the statute was void for vagueness because certain cities in Iowa were unable to provide sex offenders with full information on the location of restricted areas and that measuring 2,000-foot buffer zones was a difficult and uncertain process. The court rejected this challenge, stating that potential problems do not render the entire statute unconstitutional on its face. The court reasoned that while individual sex offenders may, in practice, have a legitimate challenge as applied to them, the possibility that a sex offender may unknowingly violate the statute because of incomplete information was not enough to invalidate the entire statute.

The Miller court next addressed the claim that the Iowa statute violated procedural due process safeguards by depriving sex offenders of a hearing to consider the dangerousness of individuals before subjecting them to residence restrictions. Ordinarily, an individual must be given an opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of a property or liberty interest. However, in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, the Supreme Court stated that “due process does not entitle [a sex offender] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the statute.” Furthermore, procedural due process does not prohibit states from creating classifications among sex offenders. Since the Iowa statute applied equally to all sex offenders convicted of crimes against minors regardless of present or future dangerousness, the court found that providing individuals with an opportunity for a hearing would be unnecessary.

Opponents of residence restrictions argue that the limitations placed upon sex offenders’ housing options and the strain on familial relations amount to a deprivation of liberty and require significant procedural
safeguards. Commentators point to Kansas v. Hendricks in arguing that a conviction for one of a wide range of sex offenses standing alone should not be enough to satisfy procedural due process. However, the statute at issue in Hendricks imposed civil commitment on sex offenders, thus depriving them of their total liberty interest. Residence restrictions may force sex offenders to look for housing in less desirable areas, but these laws do not restrict offenders from engaging in daily activities nor do they prevent offenders from living with family members in homes located outside of established buffer zones.

Opponents of residence restrictions have made a stronger argument regarding the failure of state statutes to provide adequate notice. First, both sex offenders subject to restrictions and local officials have had difficulty in ascertaining which areas are off-limits to sex offenders. Second, opponents argue that vague language included in state statutes fails to provide adequate notice of restricted areas. For example, statewide restrictions in Texas prohibit sex offenders from residing "within 1,000 feet of a premises where children commonly gather." Left to the imagination, these areas could encompass a variety of community facilities, including shopping centers, gymnasiums, and churches.

Recognition by the Eighth Circuit in Miller that statewide residence restrictions may be invalid as applied leaves statewide restrictions vulnerable in the future. Clearly, this language is dicta. However, another circuit may borrow this sentiment to strike down residence restrictions elsewhere that fail to provide clear information regarding the parameters of prohibited conduct.

B. Substantive Due Process

The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the substantive aspects of liberty against arbitrary and unreasonable government action regardless of the fairness of procedures

143. Id. at 706.
145. Duster, supra note 123, at 762 (suggesting that the Court in Hendricks upheld the civil commitment statutes because there were provisions in place to commit only those offenders found to be most likely to reoffend, and that the Court would not have upheld the Kansas statute had it applied across the board to all offenders with convictions).
146. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 356.
147. Miller, 405 F.3d at 706 (stating that plaintiffs testified they had difficulty finding suitable housing outside of the 2,000-foot restricted areas, and that many of the available housing units were in rural parts of the state).
148. Duster, supra note 123, at 765-66 (summarizing the difficulties in knowing which areas are subject to residence restrictions because of a lack of current maps and other resources).
149. Id. at 766 (discussing vague language in the Georgia statute).
150. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12(13B) (Vernon 2005).
used. Under the doctrine of substantive due process, courts grant broad deference to legislative judgments and typically require that laws be merely rational in relation to a legitimate purpose. But when legislation infringes on fundamental rights, the state must narrowly tailor regulations “to serve a compelling state interest.” Opponents of residence restrictions against sex offenders have asserted that these laws infringe on the right to privacy, the right to travel, and the right to live where one chooses. In Miller, the Eighth Circuit determined that the Iowa restrictions did not implicate any fundamental rights, and upheld the statute under the rational basis test.

1. Right to Privacy Regarding Family Life

The Miller court rejected the claim that Iowa’s residence restrictions intrude on the right to privacy concerning family life. Respondents relied on a line of Supreme Court cases that have found “intimate human relationships” to be so central to the concept of freedom that they deserve the utmost protection from government interference. Recognizing that the doctrine of judicial restraint requires caution in extending the arena of fundamental rights, the court rejected respondents’ claim, stating that the Iowa statute did not directly intrude on “the family relationship.”

While the Supreme Court has recognized a fundamental right in personal choices relating to marriage and family life, strict scrutiny is not

151. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) (describing the substantive component of the Due Process Clause that protects individual liberty against “certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986)).

152. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222 (1953) (stating that due process provides broad deference to government in choosing the ways and means by which it carries out its policies).


154. Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005).

155. Id. at 710.

156. Id. at 714-16.

157. Id. at 709.

158. See id. at 709-10 (summarizing the development of the fundamental right to privacy regarding family relationships). Respondents leaned heavily on the ruling in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, in which the Court, in rejecting a law that prevented a grandmother from residing with her two grandsons, stated that “freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 498-99 (1977).

159. Miller, 405 F.3d at 710 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 302).

160. Id. at 710.
required when a regulation merely has “an incidental or unintended effect on the family.”\textsuperscript{161} In \textit{Griswold v. Connecticut}, the Court applied strict scrutiny to a state statute that directly imposed on the privacy of marriage by forbidding the use of contraceptives by a married couple.\textsuperscript{162} Conversely, in \textit{Miller}, the court stated that the Iowa statute did not directly operate to regulate family life nor did it prevent families from living together.\textsuperscript{163} While the court recognized that some sex offenders were prevented from living in preferred locations, the court asserted that the statute does not restrict who may live together.\textsuperscript{164}

### 2. Right to Travel

The Eighth Circuit, in \textit{Miller}, rejected respondents’ claim that the Iowa residence restrictions violate any fundamental right to travel.\textsuperscript{165} Leaning on Supreme Court recognition of the right to interstate travel,\textsuperscript{166} respondents argued that because the Iowa residence restrictions substantially infringe on the ability of sex offenders to establish residences, the law erects an unconstitutional barrier to offenders’ right to migrate from other states to Iowa.\textsuperscript{167} The court disagreed, stating that the Iowa statute did not erect a barrier to interstate movement.\textsuperscript{168}

The \textit{Miller} court refused to extend the fundamental right to travel beyond its strict application.\textsuperscript{169} In \textit{Saenz v. Roe}, the Supreme Court

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\item \textsuperscript{161} \textit{Id.} (citing Hameetman v. City of Chicago, 776 F.2d 636, 643 (7th Cir. 1985)).
\item \textsuperscript{162} 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
\item \textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id.} at 485.
\item \textsuperscript{164} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 711 (distinguishing the Iowa statute from the regulations involved in \textit{Moore} and \textit{Griswold}).
\item \textsuperscript{165} \textit{Id.} The court acknowledged that some offenders could not reside with family members who had established residences within restricted buffer zones while others were forced to move as far as forty-five miles from a preferred location. \textit{Id.} However, the court found these to be merely incidental results of the statute. \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{166} \textit{Id.} at 710. The Iowa Supreme Court rejected a similar challenge to the Iowa residence restrictions, finding that the law did not “absolutely prevent” husband and wife from living together. State v. Seering, 701 N.W. 2d 655, 663 (Iowa 2005). While the \textit{Seering} court purported to be sympathetic to the difficulties arising out of the residence restrictions on sex offenders and their families, the court stated that “the difficulties result from a social or political judgment that must be made by the legislature and not this court.” \textit{Id.} at 664.
\item \textsuperscript{167} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 711.
\item \textsuperscript{168} \textit{See} \textit{Saenz v. Roe}, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (stating that the right to interstate travel encompasses “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another state, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second state, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.”).
\item \textsuperscript{169} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 711.
\item \textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.} at 712.
\item \textsuperscript{171} \textit{See id.} at 712 (asserting that to recognize an implication of the fundamental right to
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found that a regulation violated the fundamental right to travel because it denied non-residents the same welfare benefits that were afforded to in-state residents. In distinguishing the Iowa residence restrictions from the regulation in *Saenz*, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that Iowa’s statute did not treat visitors to Iowa differently than residents, nor did it treat potential residents differently than current residents. The court rejected an alternative claim that the statute intruded on the right to intrastate travel, stating that even if the court acknowledged such a dubious right, the right to intrastate travel is correlative to the right to interstate travel, and therefore would fail under the court’s analysis.

Opponents argue that a literal interpretation of statewide restrictions prohibits visiting sex offenders from sleeping even a single night within a residential buffer zone and therefore these restrictions present a more significant intrusion on the right to travel than recognized by the *Miller* court. Under Iowa’s statute, the term “residence” is defined as “the place where a person sleeps, which may include more than one location, and may be mobile or transitory.” A literal application could potentially place homeless shelters and rehabilitation centers off limits or simply scare sex offenders into avoiding the state altogether. The *Miller* court discarded these claims, pointing to the fact that respondents were current and potential residents rather than travelers. However, the court implied that this line of argument could be effective should another group of sex offenders challenge Iowa’s restrictions or other state restrictions that have included temporary residences through statutory language.

interstate travel in considering the Iowa residence restrictions would be an unwarranted extension beyond the Supreme Court’s previous case law).

173. Id. at 505-07.
174. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 712. The court stated that all offenders were treated equally as harsh.
175. While the right to interstate travel has consistently been recognized as a fundamental right, there is a circuit split on the status of the right to intrastate travel. Compare *Lutz* v. City of York, 899 F.2d 255, 265-66 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that a city ordinance that prohibited cruising on certain streets violated a fundamental right to intrastate travel), with *Doe* v. City of Lafayette, 377 F.3d 757, 770-71 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding that a city ordinance banning sex offenders from entering public parks did not implicate any right to intrastate travel).
176. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 713.
179. *Duster*, supra note 123, at 750-51 (“A sex offender simply wanting to travel through the State might be compelled to avoid Iowa altogether lest he stop for the night at an acquaintance’s home or a motel and thereby establish an unlawful residence by unwittingly falling asleep.”).
180. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 712 n.3.
181. See id. (questioning whether concerns over temporary housing were applicable to the Respondents in the class action before the court).
3. Right to Live Where One Chooses

Reviving an argument that the Eighth Circuit had previously rejected some thirty years ago in *Prostrollo v. University of South Dakota*, respondents in *Miller* argued that residence restrictions intruded on the fundamental right to live where one chooses. The *Miller* court noted that courts should proceed with caution in deciding whether to expand the arena of fundamental rights. Declining to overturn *Prostrollo*, the court stated that respondents failed to show that the right to live where one chooses was either “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” in accordance with the test established by the Supreme Court in *Washington v. Glucksberg*.

But while the *Miller* court rejected this most intriguing substantive due process challenge, commentators have continued to press the issue. First, commentators claim that aside from discriminatory housing laws that have long been abandoned, there is no historical precedent permitting states from restraining individuals from living in homes they can otherwise afford to own. Additionally, the right to live where one pleases is said to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty because of the basic role that private property rights play in American democracy and because of

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182. 507 F.2d 775 (8th Cir. 1974). The Eighth Circuit stated that “we cannot agree that the right to choose one’s place of residence is necessarily a fundamental right.” *Id.* at 781.

183. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 713.

184. *Id.* at 713-14. The Supreme Court has placed great caution on the way in which courts proceed in matters concerning substantive due process because “[b]y extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative action.” *Id.* at 714 (quoting *Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).

185. *Id.* at 714 (quoting *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 720-21).

186. See Bernard H. Siegan, *Smart Growth and Other Infirmities of Land Use Control*, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 693, 696 (2001). In criticizing smart growth techniques—recent land use policies that restrict suburban development in favor of high-density urban development—Professor Siegan states that government bodies should not be allowed to infringe on individuals’ “fundamental freedom to move and settle where they choose.” *Id.*


188. See Richard Epstein, *Property as a Fundamental Civil Right*, 29 CAL. W. L. REV. 187, 187 (1992) (stating that in many circles, property rights are considered fundamental to our society). Professor Epstein cites Justice Bushrod Washington’s opinion in an early nineteenth century case in which Justice Washington states, riding circuit, that fundamental rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause may include “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind . . . . [and] to take, hold and dispose of property.” *Corfield v.*
the inherently undemocratic nature of government-mandated housing.\textsuperscript{189}

This argument misapplies both prongs of the Glucksberg test. Regarding the first prong, commentators incorrectly attempt to shift the burden onto the government to prove that there is a long history of restrictions against choice of residence. Secondly, judicial approval of zoning and land use regulations\textsuperscript{190} has long confirmed that private property rights are not recognized by the Court as fundamental rights under the U.S. Constitution.\textsuperscript{191} While the right to continued enjoyment of private property is one that the framers surely considered in drafting the Takings Clause,\textsuperscript{192} as well as the Due Process Clause,\textsuperscript{193} nowhere in the Constitution does it create a right to enjoy property that one does not yet own. If states and local governments are capable of crafting zoning ordinances in such a way to prohibit the future use of property for residential purposes altogether, then it seems highly unlikely that restrictions on sex offenders shopping for a new neighborhood would be so egregious such that “neither liberty nor justice would exist.”\textsuperscript{194} Surely then, the right to choice of residence cannot be inherent in the concept of ordered liberty. Furthermore, opponents of residence restrictions, including respondents in Miller, cite no case law to support the notion that this right is fundamental.\textsuperscript{195}

4. Rational Basis Review

After finding no basis to elevate scrutiny under substantive due process analysis, the Miller court analyzed Iowa’s residence restrictions to see if the restrictions “rationally advance some legitimate governmental purpose.”\textsuperscript{196} Respondents had contended that even if the court declined to

\textsuperscript{189} See Strahilevitz, supra note 187 (stating that “[g]overnment-mandated ghetto-ization is . . . a hallmark of unfree societies”).

\textsuperscript{190} See, e.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (holding that the Village of Euclid’s zoning ordinance was valid because it was not unreasonable or arbitrary in relation to its police powers).

\textsuperscript{191} See Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This the Twilight of Environmental and Land-Use Regulation?, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 961, 994 (1996) (stating that courts do not view the right to own and use private property as a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution).

\textsuperscript{192} U.S. Const. amend. V (“Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).

\textsuperscript{193} U.S. Const. Amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”).


\textsuperscript{195} See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 713-14 (8th Cir. 2005). As the Supreme Court stated in Flores, “[t]he mere novelty of such a claim is reason enough to doubt that substantive due process sustains it.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993).

\textsuperscript{196} Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16 (quoting Flores, 507 U.S. at 306).
strictly scrutinize the Iowa statute, the restrictions were irrational. While admitting that the State had identified a highly legitimate interest in attempting to protect the safety of children, respondents argued that there was no scientific evidence to demonstrate that prohibiting sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or child-care facility would further this interest. The court rejected this contention, stating that the chosen residency restrictions were reasonable in light of the serious threat posed by sex offenders to the safety and welfare of children.

The court’s reasoning confirms that even when a statutory regulation is suspect, courts will defer to legislative judgment as long as there is a shred of reasonableness present. Considering that twelve other states had enacted residence restrictions at the time, the court found that although there was evidence doubting the link between residential proximity and a sex offender’s likelihood of reoffending, the Iowa Legislature acted with proper authority in weighing the credibility of the evidence. In evaluating the classification created by the statute, the court noted that the legislature was properly situated to arrive at a distance requirement to be used in the creation of buffer zones, and found nothing wrong with grouping sex offenders together given evidence of sex offenders’ high rate of recidivism. The court concluded by summarizing the essence of rational basis review: that courts will not find a regulation when, as in Miller, policymakers employ “common sense” in imposing means to

197. Id. at 714.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The court stated that “where precise statistical data is unavailable and human behavior is necessarily unpredictable,” the state legislature has the authority to determine the best course of action to protect the interests of its citizens. Id.
201. See id. at 714-16 (concluding that the residence restrictions created by the Iowa Legislature were not without a rational basis despite a lack of evidence as to their potential effectiveness). Furthermore, in Jones v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that when a legislature “undertakes to act in areas fraught with medical and scientific uncertainties, legislative options must be especially broad and courts should be cautious not to rewrite legislation.” 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983).
202. Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16. The court acknowledged that a Minnesota Department of Corrections study found no evidence that residential proximity had any correlation with a sex offender’s likelihood to commit another offense. Id. at 714.
203. Id.
204. Id. The court noted that the decision to provide for 2,000-foot buffer zones was the sort of task for which the legislature was well suited. Id.
205. Id. at 715-16. The court looked specifically at recent Supreme Court opinions addressing restrictions placed on sex offenders in light of high rates of recidivism. See Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 4 (2003) (“When convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sexual assault.”).
effectuate a legitimate interest.\textsuperscript{206}

Did the \textit{Miller} court turn a blind eye to evidence that residence restrictions have no effect on reducing recidivism? The court declined to give much weight to evidence of lower-than-expected recidivism rates, noting that residence restrictions had not been in place long enough to collect adequate empirical evidence and characterizing the evidence brought forth as speculative at best.\textsuperscript{207} Though recent studies have suggested rates of recidivism for sex offenders are much lower than once believed, as discussed further in Part V, courts are extremely deferential to legislative decision-making under the rational basis test.

\section*{C. Self-Incrimination}

The Self-Incrimation Clause of the Fifth Amendment protects persons against providing testimonial information that may be used against them in a criminal prosecution.\textsuperscript{208} While a court will invalidate a law that “compels testimony by threatening to inflict . . . sanctions unless the . . . privilege is surrendered,”\textsuperscript{209} it must also be clear that a real and appreciable danger of incrimination exists.\textsuperscript{210}

Respondents in \textit{Miller} argued that Iowa’s residence restrictions, in combination with state registration requirements, violated the Fifth Amendment because they forced sex offenders to incriminate themselves or face punishment for failure to register.\textsuperscript{211} The court rejected this challenge, stating that while Iowa’s registration requirements allegedly compel testimonial statements that could incriminate a sex offender living in a restricted zone,\textsuperscript{212} Iowa’s residence restrictions merely limit where a sex offender may reside.\textsuperscript{213} Rather than treat these two laws as a uniform

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\textsuperscript{206} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 716. Noting that there was no evidence that the Iowa legislature acted “merely on negative attitudes toward . . . or a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” the court found no reason to deviate from deference to legislative decisions under rational basis review. \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{207} \textit{Id}. at 714. Interestingly, the court also suggested that Iowa’s decision to pass residence restrictions was rational considering the fact that twelve other states had enacted their own set of restrictions. \textit{Id}. While Iowa may have truly believed that residence restrictions would help prevent sex crimes against children, the fact that “every other state is doing it” is not a convincing justification.
\textsuperscript{208} U.S. CONST. amend. V.
\textsuperscript{209} Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-05 (1977) (holding that a state may not compel testimony by a defendant concerning the conduct of his public office, although a state may use evidence derived from other sources in the prosecution).
\textsuperscript{210} Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968).
\textsuperscript{211} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 716.
\textsuperscript{212} Under a separate statute, Iowa requires sex offenders to register their address with the appropriate county sheriff’s office. IOWA CODE § 692.2 (2005).
\textsuperscript{213} \textit{Miller}, 405 F.3d at 716.
regulatory scheme, the court treated residence restrictions separately. Under this strict interpretation, the court distinguished previous cases in which the Supreme Court had found violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause.214 The court discerned that while courts may invalidate registration requirements that create a real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination, the underlying substantive law is not, by itself, unconstitutional.215

After suggesting that the intended target should have been the registration requirements, the *Miller* court asserted that a self-incrimination challenge to the registration requirements would be premature.216 Evidence showed that local officials had taken a flexible approach to enforcement by giving sex offenders time to find alternative housing;217 consequently, sex offenders would have difficulties proving that there is a real and appreciable hazard of self-incrimination.

While the *Miller* court rejected the self-incrimination challenge, the court left the door open for future challenges. Hypothetically, if a sex offender registers an address that violates residence restrictions and is then prosecuted based on the information provided, without being given a chance to move to an unrestricted area, the issue of self-incrimination becomes ripe.218 Considering that all fifty states now have registration requirements,219 each state would be wise to ensure that its local law enforcement officials continue to provide sex offenders with an opportunity to move out of non-conforming residences before charging offenders with violating the statute.

**D. Ex Post Facto Laws**

Article I, § 10 of the U.S. Constitution prevents states from enacting laws that seek to retroactively increase the punishment for a crime that has already been committed.220 In analyzing whether a state law violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, courts look at whether the law operates as a

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214. *Id.* at 716-17. For example, the court distinguished a case in which the Supreme Court held that requirements for payment of tax on marijuana imports violated the Self-Incrimination Clause, but did not suggest that laws criminalizing possession of marijuana were illegal. *See Leary v. United States*, 395 U.S. 6, 29 (1969).

215. *See Miller*, 405 F.3d at 716-17 (asserting that in previous cases, the Supreme Court narrowly tailored the holdings in Self-Incrimination Clause challenges to merely prohibit compulsion of registration and tax payment provisions for persons engaged in illegal activities). The court stated that in all of these cases the Supreme Court did not mean to imply that the Self-Incrimination Clause rendered the substantive law illegal. *Id.*

216. *Id.* at 717.

217. *Id.* at 717 n.5.

218. *Id.* at 717-18.

219. *See supra* note 39 and accompanying text.

220. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 718.
punishment. If the legislature intended to enact a criminal punishment, that law is automatically deemed to be punitive and unconstitutional. However, if the legislature intended to create a civil regulatory measure, then the law will be presumed to be valid unless it is excessively punitive.

While conceding that the Iowa Legislature intended to enact a civil statutory scheme, respondents in *Miller* argued that residence restrictions against sex offenders were so punitive as to amount to retroactive punishment. A majority of the three-judge panel rejected this contention, concluding that respondents failed to carry their burden of proof. After acknowledging that the purpose behind the statewide residence restrictions was to protect the health and safety of Iowa’s citizens, the majority used the five guideposts from *Smith v. Doe* to dismantle the notion that the Iowa statewide restrictions were excessively punitive.

First, the majority rejected the argument that the restrictions amounted to banishment, a traditionally recognized form of punishment. The majority reasoned that unlike banishment, residence restrictions do not expel offenders from their communities, and because of the novelty of residence restrictions, there was no historical basis for finding these laws to be traditionally punitive. Second, the majority stated that the restrictions did not act primarily to promote the traditional aims of punishment. While the majority agreed that the law could have both a deterrent and retributive effect, the primary purpose of the residence

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222. *Id.* Laws that are civil will nevertheless be invalidated when found to be “‘so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State’s] intention’ to deem it ‘civil.’” *Kansas v. Hendricks*, 521 U.S. 346, 361 (1997) (quoting *United States v. Ward*, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
223. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 718.
224. *See id.* at 718-23 (finding that the residence restrictions withstood the five-factor Ex Post Facto Clause analysis).
225. 538 U.S. at 92.
226. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 719. The court detailed the five factors adopted by the Supreme Court in *Smith* to determine whether a law has a punitive effect: “whether the law has been regarded in our history and traditions as punishment, whether it promotes the traditional aims of punishment, whether it imposes an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has a rational connection to a nonpunitive purpose, and whether it is excessive with respect to that purpose.” *Id.*
227. *Id.* In *Smith*, the Supreme Court stated that historically, banished offenders were “expelled from the community” and not allowed to return. *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 98.
228. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 719 (citing *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 98).
229. *Id.* Under the Iowa statute, sex offenders are not prevented from going about their daily activities, traveling through, or conducting business transactions in areas surrounding schools or child-care facilities. *Id.*
230. *Id.* at 720.
231. *Id.*
restrictions was to protect the safety of children. Next, the majority considered whether the restrictions “impose[d] an affirmative disability or restraint.” While the majority found residence restrictions to have a disabling effect, it balanced the degree of restraint against the legislature’s non-punitive purpose and ultimately deferred to the final, dual-factor inquiry of rationality. The majority concluded that the restrictions were rationally related to a legitimate purpose and were not excessive in relation to that purpose. Specifically, the majority validated the categorical regulation of sex offenders and the legislature’s decision to apply 2,000-foot buffer zones.

In his dissent from the holding regarding the ex post facto challenge, Judge Melloy concluded that Iowa’s residence restrictions were excessively punitive in effect, and should not be applied to sex offenders who committed crimes prior to enactment of the law. Judge Melloy took

232. *Id.* The majority first asserted that while Iowa’s residence restrictions could have a deterrent effect, the primary purpose behind the law was to reduce the temptation for sex offenders to reoffend. *Id.* Similarly, the majority found that while the restrictions may have a retributive effect if they happened to parallel a sex offender’s degree of wrongdoing in application, this effect would merely be incidental. *Id.* Furthermore, the Supreme Court has warned against giving too much weight to this factor, considering that despite their purpose, many, if not most, regulations have a deterrent effect. See *Smith*, 538 U.S. at 102.

233. *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 720.

234. *Id.* at 721. Respondents presented evidence that the statute prohibited some sex offenders from otherwise living with family members and spouses in areas covered by the residence restrictions. *Id.*

235. *Id.* As the Supreme Court did in *Smith* and *Hendricks*, the majority “considered the degree of the restraint involved in light of the legislature’s countervailing nonpunitive purpose.” *Id.*

236. *Id.*

237. *Id.* Leaning on findings in *Smith* that sex offenders have a high risk of recidivism, the majority asserted that the legislature could reasonably believe that residence restrictions would be an effective measure for preventing new sex offenses against children. *Id.*

238. *Id.* at 721-23. In addressing what the majority titled “the most significant factor,” the court concluded that “the Does have not established the ‘clearest proof’ that Iowa’s choice is excessive in relation to its legitimate regulatory purpose, such that a statute designed to be nonpunitive . . . should be considered retroactive criminal punishment.” *Id.* at 723.

239. *Id.* at 721. The majority asserted that “[t]he Ex Post Facto Clause does not preclude a State from making reasonable categorical judgments that conviction of specified crimes should entail particular regulatory consequences.” *Id.* (quoting *Smith v. Doe*, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003)). The majority concluded that a categorical rule against sex offenders would not be excessive because among other reasons, the legislature is not required to narrowly tailor the restrictions to meet the “‘excessiveness’ prong of the ex post facto analysis.” *Id.* at 722.

240. *Id.* at 722-23. Noting that the Iowa statute was one of the first of its kind in the nation and the difficulties in determining a proper distance requirement, the majority chose not to disturb the legislature’s decision. *Id.*

241. *Id.* at 723-25 (Melloy, J., dissenting) (finding four out of five factors weighed in favor of an ex post facto violation).
a more liberal approach to the historical punishment inquiry. He found that while Iowa’s residence restrictions did not expel sex offenders completely, the restrictions amounted to partial banishment because sex offenders were stigmatized and could not find housing at all in certain cities. He then determined that Iowa’s law effectuated the traditional notion of deterrence. Unlike the majority, Judge Melloy argued that the affirmative disability imposed by the restrictions could not be overlooked. Finally, while Judge Melloy agreed that there was a rational connection at play, he argued that the restrictions were excessive in relation to the legitimate purpose of protecting the public. He stated that because of the severe limitations placed upon sex offenders, the uniform application of these restrictions without regard to individual dangerousness, and their lifetime application, Iowa’s restrictions were excessively punitive.

The fate of these laws appears to be, at least partially, at the mercy of empirical battles. Throughout its opinion, the Miller majority leaned heavily on findings by the Supreme Court that sex offenders have a higher risk of recidivism than other types of offenders. Recent studies paint a different picture, suggesting that sex offenders do not reoffend as often as previously thought. Because courts recognize the fifth factor as the most significant, future challenges under the Ex Post Facto Clause may hinge on the results of future empirical studies and sources of evidence considered by courts.

242. Id. at 724 (comparing the stigma attached to sex offenders to colonial punishments such as “shaming, branding, and banishment”).
243. Id. The effect of the residence restrictions was to force sex offenders to leave their communities and live in rural areas or leave the state altogether. Id.
244. Id. at 725.
245. Id. Judge Melloy stated that it is impossible to distinguish between the legislative purpose of reducing the opportunity to reoffend and the increase in negative consequences of an action effectuated by the residence restrictions. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 726.
249. See supra note 205. For example, the majority cited this notion in concluding that Iowa’s residence restrictions were rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of reducing the risk of future sex offenses against minors. Miller, 405 F.3d at 721.
250. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
251. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 721 (stating that the fourth and fifth factors, relating to whether a regulation is excessive in relation to a rational purpose, are the most significant factors in the analysis).
V. ANALYZING FLORIDA’S APPROACH TO RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS

A. Lessons from Miller: Upholding Florida’s Statewide Restrictions Under the Eighth Circuit’s Analysis

In analyzing the validity of statutes enacted by the Florida Legislature, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized that statutes are “clothed with a presumption of constitutionality.” The State of Florida has discretion under its “police powers” to enact policies for the health and safety of its constituents. As long as the exercise of the police powers is not arbitrary and capricious, the State may enact legislation reasonably related to safeguarding its children from harm when the potential harm outweighs the interests of individuals targeted by the regulation. Drafted with a reasonable belief that buffer zones will reduce the temptation and opportunities for sex offenders to commit new crimes against children, Florida’s statewide residence restrictions are a rational extension of this authority. In considering the constitutional validity of these restrictions, it may be helpful to analyze the Florida Legislature’s approach under the framework used by the Eighth Circuit in Miller.

On their face, Florida’s statewide restrictions do not contravene principles of procedural due process guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. The Miller court rejected the notion that sex offenders had a constitutionally guaranteed right to an individual hearing. As in Miller, the classifications drawn by the Florida Legislature, in drafting the statewide restrictions, do not require a special procedure for individual determinations of dangerousness. Both of Florida’s statewide restrictions impose blanket prohibitions against a group of offenders who have previously committed crimes against children. Since proof of future dangerousness is not material to the application of these provisions, due process does not entitle sex offenders to any hearing to prove otherwise.

252. City of Miami v. McGrath, 824 So. 2d 143, 146 (Fla. 2002).
254. McInerney v. Irvin, 46 So. 2d 458, 463 (Fla. 1950) (holding that a statute regulating the use of communication wires by public utilities was not arbitrary or capricious, and therefore, was a valid exercise of the state’s police power).
255. Jones v. State, 640 So. 2d 1084, 1086 (Fla. 1994) (holding that Florida’s statutory rape provision was constitutional, despite intrusion on privacy interests).
256. Miller, 405 F.3d at 709 (concluding that individualized hearings were not required because the statute did not provide for exemptions to the classification based on dangerousness).
257. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005).
258. See id.; id. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2).
259. See Conn. Dept of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 7 (2003) (stating that “due process does not entitle [the sex offender] to a hearing to establish a fact that is not material under the
In addition, Florida’s statewide restrictions likely provide sex offenders with adequate notice. In *Miller*, the court rejected the claims that potential problems with interpretation of restricted areas of residence and variations in enforcement amounted to inadequate notice in the Iowa statute. Like Iowa’s statute, § 794.065 establishes the offenders to which the restrictions apply, a finite number of facilities from which offenders are restricted, and the distance required for offenders to adequately separate from such facilities.

There is a legitimate argument that Florida’s restrictions against sexual predators have the potential to be overbroad in application. Section 947.1405 prohibits sexual predators from living within 1,000 feet of public school bus stops and “other place[s] where children regularly congregate.” These restricted areas are not clearly defined like the Iowa statute in *Miller*, nor are they identifiable to the common observer. However, since sexual predators are supervised and placed in housing by the Department of Corrections (DOC), the DOC is responsible for compliance with the statute. Thus, a sexual predator is not denied due process by this provision.

The existence of separate ordinances in some municipalities could complicate enforcement efforts for local law enforcement agencies charged with carrying out the statewide restrictions. However, as the court in *Miller* suggested, the potential for varied enforcement in Florida will not be sufficient to invalidate the statute. Therefore, any successful challenge under procedural due process would likely be limited to an as-applied challenge.

Under a substantive due process analysis, Florida’s statewide residence restrictions are clearly a rational extension of the State’s authority under the police powers. In following the reasoning of *Miller*, while § 794.065 and § 947.1405 may create obstacles in the day-to-day life of sex

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261. Iowa’s statute applies broadly to a person who has committed a criminal offense against a minor, or an aggravated offense, sexually violent offense, or other relevant offense. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A(1) (2005). In comparison, Florida’s statute of general application is more precise, noting four specific crimes that make up the classification of offenders under the statute. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.

262. *Compare* IOWA CODE § 692.2A(2) (2005) (including public and non-public elementary and secondary schools as well as child-care facilities), with FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (including schools, day-care centers, parks, and playgrounds).


265. *Id.*

266. *See* Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 709 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that “due process does not require that independently elected county attorneys enforce each criminal statute with equal vigor”).
offenders, the restrictions do not intrude upon any fundamental rights.267 Despite Florida’s express recognition of fundamental rights in areas where the U.S. Supreme Court has refrained from recognition,268 none of these rights are implicated by the buffer zones. As with Iowa’s statute, Florida’s statute of general application, § 794.065, does not expressly dictate with whom a sex offender may live269 and therefore, effects upon family life are indirect and incidental to the personal circumstances of a sex offender. Similarly, § 794.065 imposes no obstacle on the free movement of citizens of other states who wish to enter and exit the State of Florida. Finally, the notion that Florida courts would recognize a fundamental right to live where one chooses has absolutely no basis. Considering that Florida has long been a leader in the area of state-powered land use regulation,270 it is highly unlikely that the right to choose one’s future neighborhood would be afforded any heightened interest.

Because no fundamental rights are implicated, Florida’s statewide restrictions are sustainable under rational basis review.271 Though the wisdom of placing residence restrictions against sex offenders may be debatable, these laws clearly have some grounding in the legitimate purpose of ensuring the safety of children.272 As noted in Miller, the Supreme Court has recognized that “victims of sexual assault are most often juveniles” and “when convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be re-arrested for a new rape or sex assault.”273 Despite arguments that recidivism is much lower than once perceived, experts still assert that limiting temptation is an important factor in reducing the likelihood that sex offenders will

267. See id. at 709-13 (finding that incidental burdens placed upon family life and the ability to travel between states do not amount to intrusions on fundamental rights).

268. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that public education is not a fundamental right under the Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29-39 (1973). However, in 1998, Florida amended the state constitution to make education a “fundamental value.” FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (amended 1998).


271. See Miller, 405 F.3d at 714-16 (upholding Iowa’s residence restrictions under rational basis review, in the absence of “a constitutional liberty interest that has been raised to the status of fundamental right”).

272. See Recent Legislation, Criminal Law—Sex Offender Notification Statute—Alabama Strengthens Restrictions on Sex Offenders, 119 HARV. L. REV. 939, 945 (2006). While not convinced that sex offender laws are effective, the editors of the Harvard Law Review posited that “[g]iven their popularity, their potential deterrent value, and the possibility that they may prevent even a small number of crimes, tough sex offender laws appear to be rational . . . public policy.” Id.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PUBLIC OUTCRY

Therefore, Florida lawmakers, many of whom have children of their own, may perceive a risk that sex offenders convicted of harming children may harm children again if they have easy access to children.

Moreover, in its decision in *Doe v. Moore*, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated that it will not interfere with reasonable regulations placed on sex offenders for the benefit of the state’s citizens. In rejecting appellants’ claim that the Sex Offender Act infringed on fundamental rights to privacy and interstate travel, the Eleventh Circuit stated that the mere burdens imposed by registration and notification requirements do not suggest that these regulations are unreasonable in light of their rational connection to the legitimate purpose of preventing future sex offenses.

There is, undoubtedly, at least some logic in preventing sex offenders from having easy access to children. Accordingly, the rulings in *Moore* and *Miller* suggest that opponents of residence restrictions in Florida will have to look to a constitutional basis other than substantive due process to challenge the rationality of these laws, at least in federal court.

Self-incrimination challenges to Florida’s statewide restrictions deserve some consideration. Sex offenders in Florida are required to register their address and location with local law enforcement under the Florida Sex Offender Act. But under the *Miller* analysis, because Florida’s statewide residence restrictions do not expressly require a sex offender to provide any information to law enforcement, the substantive rule prohibiting residence within designated buffer zones of 1,000 feet stands independently. While law enforcement agencies in Florida have taken a deliberate approach to enforcing these restrictions, the possibility that registration could be used as the sole evidence of a violation would raise concerns about Florida’s statewide restrictions as applied to that offender.

274. Some sex offenders have admitted that restricting access to children will help reduce impulsive temptations to commit an offense. Levenson & Cotter, supra note 13, at 173.
275. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
276. Doe v. Moore, 410 F.3d 1337, 1345 (11th Cir. 2005) (“We can certainly understand how a person may be shunned by a person or group that discovers his past offense . . . but, a state’s publication of truthful information that is already available to the public does not infringe the fundamental constitutional rights of liberty and privacy.”).
277. Id. at 1348-49.
278. Id.
279. Supra notes 43 & 46 and accompanying text.
281. See Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 716 (8th Cir. 2005).
282. See Ives, supra note 1, at A1 (stating that Ocala police officers gave William Smith Jr. several warnings before arresting him for violating the residence restrictions).
283. See Duster, supra note 123, at 768-69 (stating that registration of the address provides
incriminate themselves, it seems unlikely that both the registration requirement and residence restrictions can constitutionally coexist if local law enforcement agencies immediately act to arrest sex offenders who fail to register new addresses.

While the ex post facto challenge in *Miller* was the most serious attack on Iowa’s residence restrictions, Florida’s current statewide residence restrictions are better suited to withstand attacks under the Ex Post Facto Clause. First, Florida’s statewide restrictions impose less restrictive buffer zones than those upheld in *Miller*. While Iowa’s statute provides for buffer zones of 2,000 feet, both § 794.065 and § 947.1405 limit the restricted areas to 1,000 feet. Second, and more significantly, while Iowa’s statute applied retroactively, § 794.065 only applies to those offenders convicted after the laws were enacted. Admittedly, § 947.1405 applies retroactively to those sexual predators committing offenses between October 1, 1995 and September 30, 2004. However, the restriction is a term of conditional release. Because a sexual predator remains under the control of the State, residence restrictions do not increase the term of confinement. Thus, the Florida Legislature has likely protected the statewide restrictions against ex post facto attacks.

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284. A finding that Florida’s statewide restrictions survive a facial attack under the Ex Post Facto Clause would automatically prevent any as-applied challenge. See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001) (holding that a state statute found to be civil in nature, cannot be deemed punitive “‘as applied’ to a single individual in violation of the Double Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses”).


286. FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a) (2005); id. § 794.065. Under the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in *Miller*, there is no reason to think that this policy choice is excessive. See *Miller*, 405 F.3d at 723.

287. See FLA. STAT. § 794.065(2) (2005) (“This section applies to any person convicted of a violation . . . for offenses that occur on or after October 1, 2004.”). While § 947.1405 applies retroactively to any sexual predator convicted of a crime committed after October 1, 1995, the restriction is a term of conditional release. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a).

288. Id. § 947.1405(7)(a).

289. Id.

290. See Mayes v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 967 (Fla. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Mayes v. Crosby, 539 U.S. 904 (2003) (holding that the conditional release program was not a recidivist program that imposed an enhanced criminal penalty or sentence); see also Cal. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 512-14 (1995) (rejecting an ex post facto challenge to a California law postponing parole hearings).

291. However, the Florida Legislature may want to revisit bus stop provisions within § 947.1405 and proposed amendments to § 794.065. Recent decisions in Eleventh Circuit district courts suggest that prohibiting sex offenders from living within a certain distance from public school bus stops may give rise to a legitimate ex post facto challenge. See Doe v. Baker, No. Civ.A. 1:05-CV-2265, 2006 WL 905368, at *4 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 5, 2006) (upholding Georgia’s current sex offender law, but finding that “[a] more restrictive act that would in effect make it impossible for
Under the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in *Miller*, Florida’s statewide restrictions should withstand judicial scrutiny. The State has wide latitude in the use of its police powers to protect its citizens. While these restrictions do present potential procedural due process and self-incrimination concerns on an as-applied level, they are not facially invalid under the *Miller* analysis. As drafted, the current restrictions are surely not the end-all solution to preventing future sex crimes. Nevertheless, Florida lawmakers should not be prohibited from zoning out sex offenders from areas heavily trafficked by children.

B. *Unintended Consequences*

Regardless of the constitutional validity of these restrictions, the greater concern may lie in their effectiveness, or lack thereof. Both commentators and local officials have pointed out a number of unintended consequences associated with residence restrictions that may inhibit their utility. These include problems with enforcement, the potential that residence restrictions may prove counterproductive, negative impacts on the families of sex offenders, and effects on the interrelations between local governments.

1. Problems with Enforcement

A number of law enforcement and other local governmental agencies have described the difficulties associated with enforcing residence restrictions. First, many communities lack the resources to effectively monitor the movement of sex offenders. Enforcement has been made a registered sex offender to live in the community would in all likelihood constitute banishment”); *see also* Whitaker v. Perdue, No. Civ. A. 4:06-CV-0140-CC (N.D. Ga. June 27, 2006), *available at* http://www.schr.org/aboutthecenter/pressreleases/HB1059_litigation/LegalDocuments/CooperORDER.6.27.06.pdf (issuing an injunction to prevent the enforcement of new legislation in Georgia preventing general sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of a public school bus stop).

292. *Supra* notes 253-55 and accompanying text.

293. Duster, *supra* note 123, at 771-75 (stating that residence restrictions may have negative consequences, including creating clusters of sex offenders, compromising rehabilitation efforts, deflating real estate values, frustrating the job of parole officers, and encouraging sex offenders to avoid registration requirements); IOWA COUNTY ATT’YS ASSOC., STATEMENT ON SEX OFFENDER RESIDENCE RESTRICTIONS IN IOWA 1-4 (2006), *available at* http://spd.iowa.gov/filemgmt/visit.php?lid=284 [hereinafter IOWA CAA] (stating that residence restrictions in Iowa are difficult to enforce, contribute to homelessness and a decrease in sex offender registration, frustrate efforts to prosecute sex offenders, punish the innocent families of sex offenders, and put efforts to rehabilitate sex offenders into jeopardy).

294. Sonji Jacobs & Jill Young Miller, *Sex Offender’s Tough Bill Gets Panel’s Approval: Sheriffs Leery of 1,000-Foot Ban Around Bus Stops*, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Mar. 22, 2006, at B1 (stating that while sheriffs in Georgia support residence restrictions, they foresee
even more difficult when sex offenders avoid registering their addresses with local authorities.\textsuperscript{295} Considering that Florida has the nation’s third highest population of sex offenders living within its borders,\textsuperscript{296} monitoring these offenders may prove daunting.\textsuperscript{297} Additionally, local ordinance provisions prohibiting landlords from renting to sex offenders may be extraordinarily difficult to enforce, considering that sex offenders are not required to divulge information about the ownership of their residence in fulfilling the statutory registration requirement.\textsuperscript{298}

Residence restrictions may also impede prosecutorial efforts to obtain confessions and negotiate plea bargains with sex offenders. Prosecutors in Iowa have claimed that these effects may lead to a decrease in the number of sex offenders who are held accountable for their crimes.\textsuperscript{299} Because Florida’s statewide buffer zones operate indefinitely,\textsuperscript{300} sex offenders in Florida may be less inclined to cooperate with prosecutors. Then again, the threat of longer sentences imposed under the Jessica Lunsford Act\textsuperscript{301} may encourage offenders to come to the table.

2. Potential Increase in Rates of Recidivism

If Florida lawmakers are truly concerned with preventing sex crimes against children, they should be mindful that current residence restrictions might actually result in higher rates of recidivism among sex offenders. Particularly, opponents argue that these restrictions compromise the rehabilitation efforts of sex offenders.\textsuperscript{302} Schools, parks, playgrounds, and
child-care facilities are typically located in those same areas where sex offenders work, socialize and receive treatment. Opponents claim that sex offenders are least likely to reoffend when they have access to treatment and stability in their lives.

By forcing sex offenders to move to the fringe of their communities, Florida’s statewide restrictions, coupled with tougher local restrictions in some places, may cause these offenders to suffer emotional distress and heightened temptation to reoffend. Should this be true, even those people who argue that the interests of society always trump the interests of sex offenders would likely question the wisdom of residence restrictions. While sex offender treatment centers can certainly relocate to better serve their clients, treatment alone does not prevent recidivism in some offenders. Thus, state and local officials should track the impact of these restrictions closely to ensure that they are not making a difficult problem worse.

3. Impact on Families

Sex offenders, despite their behavior, often have families. Opponents argue that families of sex offenders are unnecessarily harmed by residence restrictions when offenders have to pull children out of schools and force their spouses to find new employment. The resulting lack of suitable housing available to sex offenders forces offenders to either uproot their families from the community or separate themselves from their families altogether. While Florida’s current statewide restrictions are not as exclusive as Iowa’s, those cities with tougher local ordinances may leave few suitable options for family housing. With the number of respondents that residence restrictions “might be counterproductive” to treatment of offenders.

304. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 4 (“Efforts to rehabilitate offenders and to minimize the rate of reoffending are much more successful when offenders are employed, have family and community connections, and have a stable residence.”).
305. See supra note 13.
306. ATSA Policy Statement, supra note 13 (stating that “treatment does not work well for all offenders”).
307. IOWA CAA, supra note 293, at 2.
308. See Davey, supra note 18, at A1 (stating that many offenders in Iowa have left their families to live with clusters of sex offenders in cheap motels). The clustering of sex offenders is a fascinating issue in and of itself. See Jennifer Warren, Sex Offender Colony Proposed if Proposition Passes, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, 2006 WLNR 16921672 (reporting on one sex offender’s view that California’s ballot initiative—Proposition 83—“threatens to create chaos and wandering bands of rootless men” and that the state should create a colony for sex offenders and their families in rural California to deal with displacement issues resulting from new residence restrictions).
309. See Roberto Santiago & Sara Olkon, Up Front, Sex Crimes: Molestor Ban Poses Risks,
local buffer zones being enacted in densely populated Broward County, where there are 138 public elementary schools alone, sex offenders will likely be forced to make a difficult choice.

4. Intergovernmental Competition

The race among local governments in Florida to enact exclusive ordinances has created an urban landscape in which sex offenders are pushed out altogether. For example, because the City of Miami Beach is located on a densely populated, small barrier island, the effect of the 2,500-foot buffer zone is to prohibit sex offenders from living anywhere within the city limits. Regardless of whether these restrictions are rational, municipalities are attempting to beat each other to the punch to prevent any new sex offenders from establishing a residence. Local officials feel pressure from the community to follow the lead of neighboring municipalities for fear that their city will otherwise become a haven for sex offenders.

This intergovernmental competition presents both legal and political consequences. The effective banishment of sex offenders from communities provides ammunition for sex offenders, as well as neighboring municipalities, to challenge the constitutional validity of these local ordinances. Local ordinances that apply retroactively will have trouble fending off an ex post facto challenge. Most notably, the inclusion of temporary residences within local buffer zones may very well intrude on the right to interstate travel, a situation contemplated by the

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312. Id. (quoting Miami Beach Mayor Alan Dermer) (stating that Miami Beach has reduced its sex offender population from 33 to 23 since enacting the ordinance). “It’s a very, very positive step for this city and once again Miami Beach has led the way.” Id.

313. Rebecca Dellagloria, Law Restricting Sex Offenders Passes, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 28, 2005, at ML. In passing 2,500-foot buffer zones in the City of Hialeah, a local councilman stated that “[w]hat I didn’t want was all these other cities passing something and Hialeah becoming a dumping ground for all these [sex offenders].” Id.

314. Sherman & Waller, supra note 17, at 1B. Hollywood Mayor Mara Giulanti has stated that the city might take legal action against surrounding cities that have enacted local ordinances banning sex offenders, causing them to find refuge in Hollywood. Id.

315. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003) (stating that retroactive punishment will be considered an invalid ex post facto law when it is so excessive in its effects as to negate a non-punitive purpose).
court in *Miller*. Looking at the political ramifications, these ordinances create ill will among neighboring municipalities. Thus, local residence restrictions could conceivably have negative impacts on dealing with such shared regional issues as transportation and affordable housing.

C. **State v. Local Laws: The Case for Preemption**

The Florida Legislature has conferred broad power upon local governments to govern, provided that the ensuing regulations are not inconsistent with general or special law. However, a local government’s use of that power may be found inconsistent with state law where the State has occupied the field. Even in those cases where the State has not preempted local governments from acting, a local ordinance must not specifically conflict with state law.

The Florida Legislature has not expressly stated, within either § 947.1405 or § 794.065, that municipalities are prohibited from enacting legislation differing from the statewide residence restrictions. However, an argument can be made that preemption is implied. Implied preemption should be found to exist in cases where the legislative scheme is so pervasive as to evidence an intent to preempt the area of regulation and where strong public policy reasons exist for finding such an area to be preempted by the legislature. By only prohibiting sex offenders from living within 1,000-foot buffer zones, the State has allowed sex offenders to live outside of that buffer zone. Local governments enacting larger buffer zones are thus intruding on that right. Because Florida’s statewide buffer zones apply equally across the state, ostensibly without concern for

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316. See *supra* note 181.
317. While the race to the bottom regarding laws against sex offenders may seem beneficial to local politicians currently in power, adding hostility to the climate of regional dysfunction may have dangerous effects on interlocal cooperation, particularly in South Florida, where the borders between municipalities are virtually seamless and problems related to pollution, schools, transportation, and affordable housing are shared by residents between three different counties. See **LYNN A. BAKER & CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 725 (3d ed. 2004)** (positing that the “desire for local autonomy” may interfere “with regional decisionmaking even where it is most obviously preferable”).
318. *Speer v. Olson*, 367 So. 2d 207, 211 (Fla. 1978). Section 125.01(1) of the Florida Statutes grants counties the power to carry on county government. *Id.* at 211. “Unless the Legislature has preempted a particular subject relating to county government by either general or special law, the county governing body, by reason of this sentence, has full authority to act through the exercise of home rule power.” *Id.*
319. *Id.*
321. See **FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(7)(a)(2) (2005); id. § 794.065.**
322. *Tribune Co. v. Cannella*, 458 So. 2d 1075, 1077 (Fla. 1984) (holding that the Public Records Act, which provides for disclosure of information, preempts a local law relating to delay in producing records for inspection).
providing heightened restrictions in any particular geographic areas, the statutory scheme is overtly pervasive.\footnote{323} Additionally, there are a number of negative policy implications arising from the existence of competing ordinances among neighboring local governments. First, the race to push sex offenders out of communities could leave few housing options for sex offenders, causing clustering of offenders or even homelessness.\footnote{324} Second, the displacement of sex offenders from one community to another places undue burdens on local governments that choose not to enact their own ordinance.\footnote{325}

Even if implied preemption is not found, local ordinances specifically conflict with the statewide restrictions in several ways. First, a majority of local ordinances provide for buffer zones of up to 2,500 feet,\footnote{326} doubling the distance of Florida’s statewide restrictions.\footnote{327} Second, most local ordinances place residence restrictions on sex offenders for temporary residences of four or more consecutive days.\footnote{328} In contrast, a sex offender could interpret § 796.045 to permit temporary living arrangements with friends for weeks at a time, as long as the offender does not establish a residence. Finally, local ordinances impose penalties in conflict with those imposed by the State. In many cases, a sex offender in violation of both the state and local ordinances would be subject to both a criminal punishment imposed by the State and a civil fine imposed by the local government.\footnote{329}

\footnote{323. Allowing localities to expand buffer zones to 2,500 feet and beyond would frustrate the purpose of the State’s 1,000-foot buffers because locally enacted buffer zones would effectively replace those determined to be appropriate by the Florida Legislature. \textit{See} Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) (stating that municipalities are creatures of the state and suggesting that in forming policy, the state is supreme and may legislate for its citizens as it will).

\footnote{324. \textit{See supra} notes 18 & 309.

\footnote{325. \textit{See supra} note 313 and accompanying text.

\footnote{326. \textit{See supra} note 100 and accompanying text.

\footnote{327. \textit{See} FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (barring sex offenders from living within 1,000 feet of designated areas).

\footnote{328. \textit{Supra} note 102 and accompanying text. According to the court in Miller, these local prohibitions against temporary residences on their own could be fertile grounds for another court to find a local ordinance unconstitutional. \textit{See supra} note 181 and accompanying text.

\footnote{329. \textit{Compare} FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005) (punishing a violation by an offender either as a felony of the third-degree or a misdemeanor of the first-degree), \textit{with} CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT, FLA., ORDINANCE § 54-11 (2005) (imposing a fine not to exceed $500 or imprisonment not to exceed sixty days or both).}
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

A. Identifying an Opportunity for Florida Lawmakers

Florida remains at the forefront of policymaking aimed at the prevention of future sex crimes. In response to both advocacy for tougher laws against sex offenders and criticism that current restrictions are parochial, Florida legislators continue to consider reforms to statewide residence restrictions against sex offenders. In fact, considering that six greatly different proposals to modify residence restrictions against sex offenders failed to make their way out of committee in 2006, a number of bills are likely to come before the Florida Legislature when it meets again in 2007. However, before amending current legislation or enacting new legislation, legislators may benefit from the following model legislation, aimed at clarifying statutory language, expressly preempting local attempts to create separate residence restrictions, and narrowing restrictions to a more dangerous group of offenders.

B. Model Legislation

794.065. Prohibited Places of Residence for Designated Sex Offenders

(1) For purposes of this section:
   (a) “day-care center” means any child-care facility, as defined under § 402.302(2), family day-care home, as defined under § 402.302(7), or large family child-care home, as defined under § 402.302(8).
   (b) “residence” means any residential or non-residential dwelling where a restricted sex offender permanently resides, or any residential or non-residential dwelling where a restricted sex offender routinely boards, lodges or resides, including but not limited to any building or structure owned or leased by the restricted sex offender, home of a friend or family member, vacation home, hotel, motel or boarding house.


331. The model legislation contemplates a divergence in the state and local approaches of regulating “residence” of sex offenders. Current state legislation prohibits sex offenders from “resid[ing]” within 1,000 feet of designated facilities. FLA. STAT. § 794.065 (2005). Whether intentional or not, § 794.065 fails to elaborate on the meaning of “reside,” leaving the term open
(c) “restricted sex offender” means any person who has been convicted of a violation of § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145, regardless of whether adjudication has been withheld, in which the victim of the offense was less than 16 years of age.

(d) “school” means any public or private elementary or secondary school, or religious institution that provides educational instruction on a daily basis to minors.

(2)(a) It is unlawful for any restricted sex offender to establish a residence within 1,000 feet of any school, day-care center, park, or playground.

(b) The residential buffer requirement in (2)(a) of this section shall be determined by measuring the distance from the outer boundary of the residential property on which the restricted sex offender resides to the outer boundary of the school, day-care center, park, or playground in question, at their closest points. The distance shall be measured as the shortest straight line between the two points without regard to any intervening structures or objects.

(c) A restricted sex offender who violates this section and whose conviction under § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145 was classified as a felony of the first degree or higher, commits a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083. A restricted sex offender who violates this section and whose conviction under § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145 was classified as a felony of the second or third degree, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.

(d) A restricted sex offender residing within 1,000 feet of any school, day-care center, park, or playground does not violate this section if any of the following apply:

1. The restricted sex offender established a residence prior to the effective date of this section;
2. The restricted sex offender is a minor;
3. The restricted sex offender was a minor when the restricted

Surely though, the more oppressive the time prohibition, the more likely it is for a court to overturn new legislation. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility in Miller that restrictions on temporary living arrangements would offend the right to interstate travel).
sex offender committed the offense and was not convicted as an adult;

4. The restricted sex offender subsequently married the victim of the crime, and the restricted sex offender has not been convicted of any other crime listed in (1)(a) of this section;

5. The restricted sex offender is residing in a full-time rehabilitation center or is residing in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility as required by the State of Florida; or

6. The school, day-care center, park, or playground located within 1,000 feet of the restricted sex offender’s residence, that would ordinarily cause the restricted sex offender to violate the prohibition in this section, was opened or began operation after the restricted sex offender established his or her residence.332

(3) This section applies to any person convicted of a violation of § 794.011, § 800.04, § 827.071, or § 847.0145 for offenses that occur on or after October 1, 2007.

(4) This section preempts any municipality or county from enacting residence restrictions placing more restrictive prohibitions on sex offenders than those restrictions provided in this section.

VII. CONCLUSION

In accordance with a public outcry, state and local governments have enacted laws at a blistering pace to zone out sex offenders from areas where children congregate. Under the broad authority of the police powers, these residence restrictions represent legitimate steps to protect children and their families from sexual violence.333 While all governmental efforts are subject to the limits imposed by both the Florida and U.S. Constitutions, courts give great deference to the policy-making decisions of the legislature.334 So long as traditional notions of sex offenders as

332. Municipalities that have enacted residence restrictions of their own have provided, almost unanimously, identical exceptions to residence restrictions for persons committing offenses as minors, persons who established a residence prior to enactment of residence restrictions, and for persons who established a residence and then would have been in violation because of the relocation or creation of a target facility. See, e.g., CITY OF LIGHTHOUSE POINT, FLA. ORDINANCE § 54-11(d) (2005). In considering the potential for conflict with rehabilitation programs and in an attempt to bring these residence restrictions in line with a more rational approach to crime prevention, the model legislation adds an exception for those sex offenders currently committed to residing in rehabilitation centers or other correctional facilities. Cf. IOWA CODE § 692A.2A (2005). Additionally, the model legislation adds an exception for those sex offenders whose status relates solely to an unfortunate crime of statutory rape, where the offender and victim have legitimized the relationship through marriage, as these offenders seem to be far from the intended target of these buffer zones.

333. See supra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.

334. See Bush v. Holmes, 919 So. 2d 392, 398 (Fla. 2006) (stating that “[a]s a general rule,
incurable predators of children remain embedded in the minds of Florida legislators and their constituents, courts will likely uphold Florida’s current statewide restrictions.

However, with an increasing number of municipalities in Florida passing their own residence restrictions against sex offenders, it is only a matter of time before a legal challenge makes its way through the courts. In foreseeing the potential for confusion and future litigation, state lawmakers have called for new statewide restrictions that would impose stricter regulations to match many of the new local ordinances and would pre-empt local governments from enacting restrictions harsher than those operating statewide.

Residence restrictions are a legitimate tool within the constitutional mandate of legislative bodies to protect the safety and welfare of children. Nonetheless, questions remain regarding their effectiveness. Will residence restrictions discourage sex offenders like William Smith Jr. from committing future crimes, or will these laws contribute to destabilizing the lives of sex offenders, thus leading offenders to seek out potential victims? Will some communities successfully rid themselves of sex offenders while others find clusters of sex offenders moving into neighborhoods not covered by residential buffer zones?

Before putting new statewide restrictions in place, Florida lawmakers should recognize the numerous unintended consequences of current residence restrictions and consider modifying these blanket provisions that impose lifetime restrictions on thousands of people without regard to their dangerousness. Specifically, legislators should consider amending legislation to clarify statutory language, expressly preempt local attempts to create separate residence restrictions, and narrow restrictions to a more dangerous group of offenders. In order to protect the validity of statewide restrictions, courts may not reweigh the competing policy concerns underlying a legislative enactment.

335. See Susan R. Miller, Doubts Emerge Over Sex Offender Buffers, PALM BEACH POST, June 16, 2005, at 1B (“[A]lthough no legal challenges have been filed in Florida, a group of convicted sex offenders in Binghamton, N.Y., sued the city Monday, June 13, 2005, claiming that a similar law is unconstitutional and amounts to banishment.”); Santiago & Olkon, supra note 309, at A1 (“Harry Boreth, president of the Broward chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, said his office is waiting to get the right plaintiff to challenge the ordinances.”).

336. See Saunders, supra note 68, at 1C (stating that Florida House members are interested in uniformity because of the “hodge-podge” of restrictions that have contributed to one-upmanship among localities; however, there are concerns over drafting legislation that is too strict and more likely to be overturned by the courts); see also H.R. STAFF ANALYSIS OF H.B. 91, supra note 98, at 1.

337. See Colleen Jenkins, Sex Offender Laws Unfairly Lumps All Together, Some Say, St. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 22, 2005, at 3 (stating that critics of Florida’s current statewide residence restrictions against sex offenders are pushing for the adoption of a tiered approach that involves “risk assessment that separates low-risk sex offenders from their more violent counterparts”). For an example of this approach, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-128 (West 2006).
restrictions against general sex offenders, the Florida Legislature should take note of recent decisions in federal courts regarding the limits of acceptable residence restrictions.\textsuperscript{338} Legislators should avoid any attempts to create buffer zones around public school bus stops or other moving targets which are potentially overbroad in application and difficult to enforce. If politicians are truly intent on protecting the state’s youngest citizens, they must craft meaningful and constitutionally-defensible legislation that reflects more than the anxieties of the voting public.

\textsuperscript{338} See supra note 291.