Robert J. Rhee
A Response to Professor Reilly’s Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery Worldwide: What is the Role of Uncertainty in Disclosure of Non-Compliance?
Response to Peter Reilly, Incentivizing Corporate America to Eradicate Transnational Bribery Worldwide
Professor Peter Reilly’s article makes a significant contribution to the literature on the Federal Corrupt Practices Act. Corrupt business practices are immoral and, albeit potentially profit maximizing for a firm that escapes detection, have no social utility. Ideally, there should be complete compliance; realistically, we know that the world is not perfect. Professor Reilly’s article deals with an important question: Upon discovery of a violation, how is voluntary disclosure maximized? In this response, for the purpose of stimulating thought and debate, I play the devil’s advocate and explore how uncertainty of outcome can possibly affect disclosure. Read More.