Federal probation officers supervise millions of offenders who must each comply with a multitude of probation conditions. These officers need enough flexibility to deal with the evolving needs of each offender, without having to clog the court system with repeated requests for modifications. Yet federal courts differ in the amount of discretionary authority they grant to federal probation officers. In fact, some courts find a violation of the judiciary‘s Article III sentencing power when a court grants any discretionary authority to a probation officer. This Note argues, however, that federal courts can delegate a large degree of discretionary authority to an officer without violating Article III and that the amount of authority that courts delegate to probation officers should be uniform across the circuits.

Part I examines the history of federal probation, focusing on the issue of judicial delegation of authority to probation officers within the context of Article III. Part II expands upon this examination by exploring the current disagreement among the circuits with regard to the amount of discretionary authority that they permit courts to delegate to probation officers. Part II also examines probation officers‘ need for flexibility when dealing with offenders. Part III presents an example of how some states have dealt with the delegation controversy and discusses how that model might be helpful in finding a resolution on the federal level. Finally, Part IV presents a workable solution to the problem, directed both at the probation conditions specifically mentioned in the case law and more generally at the overarching necessity for probation officer discretion to respond to offenders under supervision. This Note concludes by emphasizing the need for uniformity in the level of delegation across circuits in order to achieve consistency in sentencing and efficiency within the federal courts.