57 Fla. L. Rev. 459 (2005) | 
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While investigating an assault report, a police officer observed a silver and red GMC truck parked on the roadside with skid marks behind it. Petitioner, who appeared intoxicated, stood outside the truck, and a young woman sat inside the truck. Threatening arrest, the officer requested written identification from Petitioner eleven times. When Petitioner refused to comply, the deputy arrested Petitioner for obstructing an officer in violation of section 199.280 of the Nevada Revised Statutes. The Justice Court of Union Township convicted Petitioner and fined him $ 250. In a divided opinion, the Sixth Judicial Court affirmed, finding that the application of section 171.123 of the Nevada Revised Statutes did not violate Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. Reasoning that the obligation for Petitioner to identify himself during a brief investigatory stop was a commonsense requirement, the Supreme Court of Nevada also affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in affirming the decision, HELD, that the Nevada stop-and-identify statutes did not contravene Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment guarantees.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, . . . and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.” A “seizure” occurs not only upon arrest, but also when an officer restrains an individual’s liberty by either physical force or assertion of authority. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches or seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Implicit in the Fourth Amendment is the notion that each person should maintain individual control of his own person and remain free from abusive police practices.
In Terry v. Ohio, the Court rejected application of the “probable cause” Warrant Clause requirement of the Fourth Amendment because the context required police to act swiftly in response to on-the-spot observations. Instead, focusing on the general notions underlying the Fourth Amendment, the Court employed a balancing test, weighing the government’s interest against that of the private citizen. The Terry Court utilized a two-prong reasonableness test to determine whether the officer’s conduct was “justified at its inception, and . . . reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.”
Identifying a narrow exception for the protection of law enforcement officers, the Terry Court concluded that a search for weapons is reasonable when an officer believes that an individual is armed and dangerous. The Court reasoned that the officer’s conduct of patting down the outside of the suspects’ clothing in search for weapons represented the tempered act of a police officer who responded quickly to protect himself and others from potential danger. Furthermore, the officer limited the scope of the intrusion to the discovery of concealed weapons. On policy grounds, the Court acknowledged that the lower standard of reasonable suspicion was justified because the circumstances of a Terry stop “amount to a mere ‘minor inconvenience and petty indignity.'” Concurring, Justice White acknowledged that police interrogation is a common investigative procedure but opined that a refusal to answer questions during an investigatory stop is no basis for arrest.
Subsequently, in Brown v. Texas, the Court acknowledged that the central consideration when applying the balancing test is to ensure that the government does not arbitrarily invade or restrict a citizen’s freedom solely based on an officer’s unfettered discretion. As such, a seizure is unreasonable unless legitimate societal interests require seizure of a particular individual. The effectiveness is determined by “the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest.” When detaining a person, officers must have reasonable suspicion that the detainee is involved in criminal activity.
In Brown, the Court held that the officer violated the appellant’s Fourth Amendment rights when the officer detained the appellant and required him to identify himself pursuant to title 8, section 38.02 of the Texas Penal Code. The Court found that, standing alone, appellant’s presence in an alley frequented by drug users failed to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. Because no basis existed for suspecting misconduct, the right to personal security outweighed the public’s interest in combatting criminal activity.
In Hayes v. Florida, the Court rejected the reasonable suspicion standard, favoring the more stringent probable cause standard outside the context of an arrest. The Court considered whether an officer, in the absence of probable cause or a warrant, could transport, detain, and fingerprint a suspect without obtaining consent, prior judicial authorization, or probable cause. Citing Davis v. Mississippi, the Court noted that although fingerprinting is a less serious intrusion, temporary detention at a police station for fingerprinting exceeded the bounds of investigative stops authorized under Terry. The Court held that Fourth Amendment protection applies when an officer without a warrant or probable cause “forcibly remove[s] a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport[s] him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes.”
In dicta, the Hayes majority attempted to limit its holding to those circumstances where a suspect is physically removed off-site, suggesting that an officer may fingerprint a suspect reasonably believed to be connected with a crime during a brief detention in the field. However, the majority noted that the officer must perform the fingerprinting procedure “with dispatch” to establish or negate the suspect’s involvement with the crime. Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment but criticized the majority’s dicta, opining that any on-site fingerprinting procedure also must meet the standards established in Terry. In particular, the concurring Justices suggested that on-site fingerprinting is not a justifiable intrusion under the limitations of Terry because it is not a necessary procedure to protect the officer from bodily harm.
In the instant case’s constitutional challenge, while acknowledging that the police officer asked for written identification, the instant Court limited its analysis to the Nevada statute requiring only that a suspect disclose his name. Throughout its decision, the instant Court highlighted the Terry doctrine, which permits an officer who has a reasonable suspicion to briefly detain a suspect for investigative purposes. However, the instant Court noted that the investigatory stop must be justified, be reasonably related in scope, be limited in time frame, and not resemble an arrest.
Utilizing the Terry balancing test, the instant Court concluded that the Nevada statute met the reasonableness standard of the Fourth Amendment because the identity request related directly to the purpose of the Terry stop. The instant Court found that obtaining a suspect’s identity serves an important governmental interest because identity provides information regarding a suspect’s criminal, violent, and mental disorder behaviors. Reasoning that the Nevada statute did not alter the duration or location of the Terry stop, the instant Court concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred.
Further, the instant Court rejected Petitioner’s argument that the Nevada statute contravened the probable cause standard required under the Fourth Amendment, and the Court, in effect, allowed an officer to arrest on the basis of mere reasonable suspicion. The instant Court acknowledged well-established limitations of the Terry stop as adopted in Brown and Hayes to address the concern of abusive and arbitrary police conduct. Nonetheless, the instant Court emphasized the Hayes dicta, suggesting that an officer who meets the reasonable suspicion standard of Terry may obtain a suspect’s identity by compelling the suspect to acquiesce to fingerprinting during a brief detention. Reasoning that the request for identification was a commonsense inquiry reasonably related to the circumstances of the Terry stop, the instant Court held that the Nevada statute did not circumvent the probable cause guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.
Moreover, although the instant Court acknowledged a lengthy history supporting a detainee’s right to decline answering interrogatories during an investigatory stop, the majority rejected this history as noncontrolling dicta. Stating that a detainee’s legal obligation to identify himself arises from the Nevada statute and not from the Fourth Amendment, the instant Court found that such dicta did not address the question at issue. Three dissenting Justices criticized the majority, opining that this type of strong dicta, which has remained undisturbed for over twenty years, is a statement of the law to the legal community. Recognizing that the instant Court’s decision may extend to requiring a suspect to produce a license number or residence address, the dissenting Justices expressed concerns regarding the far-reaching implications of the majority’s decision.